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of State and Local Emergency Power 
Karen J. Pita Loor 
ABSTRACT 
The President’s use of emergency authority has recently ignited 
concern among civil rights groups over national executive emergency 
power. However, state and local emergency authority can also be 
dangerous and deserves similar attention. This article demonstrates that, 
just as we watch over the national executive, we must be wary of and check 
on state and local executives—and their emergency management law 
enforcement actors—when they react in crisis mode. This paper exposes 
and critiques state executives’ use of emergency power and emergency 
management mechanisms to suppress grassroots political activity and 
suggests avenues to counter that abuse. I choose to focus on the 
executive’s response to protest because this public activity is, at its core, 
an exercise of a constitutional right. The emergency management one-
size-fits-all approach, however, does not differentiate between political 
activism, a flood, a terrorist attack, or a loose shooter. Public safety 
concerns overshadow any consideration of protestors’ individual rights. 
My goal is to interject liberty considerations into the executive’s calculus 
when it responds to political activism. I use the case studies of the 2016 
North Dakota Access Pipeline protests, the 2014 Ferguson protests, and 
the 1999 Seattle WTO protests to demonstrate that state level emergency 
management laws and structures provide no realistic limit on the 
executive’s power, and the result is suppression of activists’ First and 
Fourth Amendment rights. Under current conditions, neither lawmakers 
nor courts realistically restrain the executive’s emergency management 
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action. I suggest a better check on executive crisis and emergency actions 
undertaken in response to mass protest. When the protest is the disaster, 
more robust judicial review of executive emergency declarations and the 
establishment of a council to guide state and local executives’ 
emergency/crisis response are crucial. 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 19, 2014, a police officer stands on the streets of 
Ferguson, Missouri, pointing an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle at an 
unarmed crowd of protesters.1 “I am going to fucking kill you! Get back, 
get back,” he yells.2 When the officer is asked his name, he responds, “Go 
fuck yourself.”3 Five days before, on August 15, 2014, a white police 
officer, Darren Wilson, shot an unarmed teenager, Michael Brown. 
Michael Brown was the fourth unarmed black man killed by a police 
officer that year.4 His death ushered in weeks of vigils and mass protests.5 
In response, state officials turn to military tactics to suppress the protests, 
treating civilians like enemies of war. Police use military grade weaponry 
and war tactics for crowd control.6 The Missouri governor declares a state 
of emergency and enacts a curfew.7 Militarized policing continues. Arrest 
numbers balloon. People are arrested for expressing dissent outside a 
                                                     
 1. AMNESTY INT’L, ON THE STREETS OF AMERICA: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN FERGUSON 10 
(2014) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP.], https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2017/04/onthestreetsofamericaamnestyinternational.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8DA-M7JC]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. It was later discovered that the officer was Lieutenant Ray Albers. Sebastian Murdock, 
Confirmed: Cop Who Threatened Ferguson Protesters is Lt. Ray Albers, HUFFPOST (Aug. 20, 2014), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/20/ray-albers-ferguson-protesters_n_5696715.html 
[https://perma.cc/FEM4-RBGM]; Linda Warren, Veteran Police Officer Who Was Filmed 
Threatening to Kill Ferguson Protesters as He Raised His Gun Resigns, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 
29, 2014), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2737819/Veteran-police-officer-filmed-threat 
ening-kill-Ferguson-protesters-raised-gun-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/PPZ7-8JQ5]. 
 4. Nicholas Quah & Laura E. Davis, Here’s a Timeline of Unarmed Black People Killed by 
Police Over the Past Year, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 1, 2015), https://www.buzzfeednews.com 
/article/nicholasquah/heres-a-timeline-of-unarmed-black-men-killed-by-police-over [https://perma. 
cc/8FJB-T5VU]. This only accounts for the police killings that garnered media attention in 2014. 
Further, killings of black women and other minorities have not obtained the same media focus. See, 
e.g., Kate Abbey-Lambertz, These 15 Black Women Were Killed During Police Encounters. Their 
Lives Matter, Too, HUFFPOST (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/13/black-
womens-lives-matter-police-shootings_n_6644276.html [https://perma.cc/NM6K-YPS7]. 
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AFTER-ACTION ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICE RESPONSE TO THE 
AUGUST 2014 DEMONSTRATIONS IN FERGUSON, MISSOURI, at xiii (2015) [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON 
REP.], https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p317-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ2R-K875]. 
 6. Id. at 53–59. 
 7. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08 (Aug. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Mo. Exec. Order 14-08], 
http://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2014/eo14_08 [https://perma.cc/9HJ8-2X2S]. 
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police-designated zone or for simply standing in place in public.8 The 
Governor activates the National Guard9 one day before the nameless 
officer takes aim at protestors with his rifle. But this officer is just one of 
many. News reports fill with images of law enforcement officers pointing 
weapons at unarmed civilians in the streets of Ferguson.10 In August and 
early September, about 300 people are arrested—many violently so—as 
they engage in protests and demonstrations in Ferguson.11 When 
questioned about the justification for the arrests, police on the ground reply 
“I don’t know,” “I can’t answer that,” or “this is a riot situation.”12 This 
paper exposes and critiques state executives’ use of emergency power and 
emergency management mechanisms to suppress grassroots political 
activity and suggests avenues to counter that abuse. 
Recently, the exercise of executive emergency power has become 
one of the great controversies of the day. Politicians and civil rights 
organizations rush to check the national executive as it engages in an 
unwise exercise of executive power, and justifies it through the rhetoric of 
emergency.13 Most recently, the President declared a national emergency 
                                                     
 8. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 7–8 (“[O]n August 18 that law enforcement 
began imposing a rule that protesters must keep walking or face arrest, unless they were in an approved 
protest area.”); see also, e.g., Verified Complaint at 1, Abdullah v. County of Saint Louis, 52 F. Supp. 
3d 936 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (No. 4:14-cv-1436) (alleging plaintiff was ordered, without lawful 
justification and in violation of his constitutional rights, to refrain from standing on public sidewalks 
in Ferguson for more than five seconds or risk being arrested). 
 9. Mo. Exec. Order 14-09 (Aug. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Mo. Exec. Order 14-09], 
https://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2014/eo14_09 [https://perma.cc/XW8H-UCMV]. 
 10. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 56; AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 
10, 14, 17; see also images for “Ferguson officer pointing gun at protesters,” GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/search?q=Ferguson+officer+pointing+gun+at+protestors&source=lnms&tb
m=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj02r3u2KvkAhW1KX0KHXRmAHwQ_AUIEygD&biw=784&bih=
768 [https://perma.cc/E8VH-WF8J]. Further, there were multiple reports of officers concealing their 
identities. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 18. 
 11. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 38. 
 12. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 15. 
 13. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency and Provokes a Constitutional 
Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-
emergency-trump.html [https://perma.cc/9YHM-R4A5]; Tamara Keith, If Trump Declares an 
Emergency to Build the Wall, Congress Can Block Him, NPR (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www. 
npr.org/2019/02/11/693128901/if-trump-declares-an-emergency-to-build-the-wall-congress-can-
block-him [https://perma.cc/Q23V-TYH3]; Nick Miroff, Lawsuit Seeks to Block Trump From 
Restricting Asylum for Migrants Who Enter U.S. Illegally, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-issues-decree-limiting-asylum-
protection-for-migrants-crossing-illegally-into-the-us/2018/11/09/f856b4ec-e431-11e8-a1c9-
6afe99dddd92_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a02361c5ef1b [https://perma.cc/877M-SJL7]; 
Benjamin A. Schupmann, Emergency Powers and Trump: Lessons from Carl Schmitt, PUB. SEMINAR 
(Mar. 22, 2019), http://www.publicseminar.org/2019/03/emergency-powers-and-trump-lessons-from-
carl-schmitt/ [https://perma.cc/ZXQ5-SR8F]; Michael D. Shear, Trump Claims New Power to Bar 
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to divert over $6.5 billion to build a wall at the United States’ southern 
border with Mexico.14 This is just one of many actions that this President 
has taken under the guise of a crisis. This Article demonstrates that, as 
with national executives, we must be wary when state and local 
executives—and their emergency management personnel—react in crisis 
mode and ultimately make use of expansive emergency powers. There is 
an existing body of scholarship examining national emergency powers.15 
However, the reality is when crises occur, state and local executives are 
the first responders.16 Some state responses have received scholarly 
attention. Scholars criticized Louisiana state and local actors’ aggressive, 
harmful, and rights-violating actions in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.17 
Yet outside the context of natural disaster, the effect of state and local 
officials’ emergency responses and policies on individual rights remains 
relatively unexamined in legal literature. This Article begins to fill that 
                                                     
Asylum for Immigrants Who Arrive Illegally, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2018/11/08/us/politics/trump-asylum-seekers-executive-order.html [https://perma.cc/86XR-H3NC]. 
 14. Peter Barker, Trump Declares a National Emergency to Build a Border Wall, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/9Q8H-TFG5]. 
 15. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Oren Gross, 
Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always be Constitutional?, 122 YALE L.J. 1011 
(2003); Lawrence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 
1801 (2004); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600 (2009). As 
an exception, after Hurricane Katrina some legal scholarship discussed the state and local response to 
that natural disaster. See MITCHELL F. CRUSTO, INVOLUNTARY HEROES: HURRICANE KATRINA’S 
IMPACT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES (2015) [hereinafter INVOLUNTARY HEROES]; Mitchell F. Crusto, State of 
Emergency: An Emergency Constitution Revisited, 61 LOY. L. REV. 471, 480–502 (2015) [hereinafter 
State of Emergency]. 
 16. See GEORGE D. HADDOW ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 2, 99 (3d 
ed. 2008); AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGAL GUIDE TO HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 151 (Ernest B. Abbot & Otto J. Hetzel, eds., 
3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter ABA GUIDE]; CARMEN FERRO ET AL., NGA CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES, 
A GOVERNOR’S GUIDE TO HOMELAND SECURITY, at v. (Nov. 2010); KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL32287, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
IN THE STATES, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND INSULAR AREAS: A SUMMARY 4 (2004) [hereinafter 
CRS REPORT SUMMARY]; State of Emergency, supra note 15, at 473–75 (discussing several 
emergency situations where state and local governments have experienced difficulty protecting civil 
liberties). State executives have statutory emergency management powers. See, e.g., Emergency 
Powers of Governor, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 44.022 (1998), 44.100 (2008); Powers and Duties of 
Governor, WASH. REV. CODE § 38.08 (2018); State of Emergency—Powers of Governor Pursuant to 
Proclamation, WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.220 (2018). Some mayors also have statutory emergency 
powers at the local level. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.010 (1973) (prior to 
amendments) (giving the mayor of Seattle the power to declare a civil emergency); see also Brent 
Appel, Emergency Mayoral Power: An Exercise in Charter Interpretation, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 686 
(1977). 
 17. See, e.g., INVOLUNTARY HEROES, supra note 15, at 11–12, 32; State of Emergency, supra 
note 15, at 488; PETER B. KRASKA, MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE 
CHANGING ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE 12 (2001). 
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void by exposing the harsh and extreme tools that government actors use 
when they perceive mass protests as the emergency. I examine the actions 
of executive state officials, both before and after the declaration of an 
emergency, and demonstrate how they violate protestors’ rights. 
Even before executives declare a legal emergency, state and local 
first responders—namely the police—can utilize emergency management 
tools to suppress protests. However, the emergency declaration aggravates 
violations of protestors’ rights. Once there is an emergency declaration, 
police are justified to use existing tools more harshly. Police can now 
engage in mass and arbitrary arrests. The arsenal of oppressive 
government tools expands because violations of emergency rules and 
procedures constitute cause for arrest. The executive institutes curfews and 
only permits expression in designated areas. Ultimately, I conclude that 
these emergency management tools—used by police and officials before 
and to a greater extent after the legal emergency—cause irreparable 
damage to the First and Fourth Amendment rights of protestors. 
I choose to focus on the executive’s response to protest because this 
public activity is, at its core, an exercise of a constitutional right. Protest 
activity is central “to the history and identity of the liberal, democratic 
nation state.”18 In the words of Justice Brandeis,  
Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think 
as you will and to speak as you think are indispensable to the discov-
ery and the spread of political truth; that, without free speech and 
assembly, discussion would be futile . . . that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people; that public opinion is a political duty, and 
that it should be a fundamental principle of American government.19  
State and local executives and the laws that govern their emergency 
powers ignore the centrality of speech in the American democratic state. 
Instead, executives utilize a “one size fits all” emergency management 
approach that does not distinguish among the events that precipitate the 
perceived crisis. Thus, state and local executives and law enforcement are 
free to and do utilize emergency management principles, mechanisms, and 
laws to respond to protests in the same manner they would a flood, 
earthquake, or tornado. 
I conducted interviews with state and local emergency management 
officials and personnel and reviewed relevant materials to understand 
crisis response structures and mechanisms at the state and local levels. I 
learned that the prevailing emergency management all-hazards approach 
                                                     
 18. LESLY J. WOOD, CRISIS AND CONTROL: THE MILITARIZATION OF PROTEST POLICING 126 
(2014). 
 19. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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does not differentiate between the different types of emergencies. State 
laws do not distinguish between a purported emergency due to protest, 
civil unrest, natural disaster, accident, terrorist event, etc. Thus, the same 
rules and principles that give executives great discretion and latitude to 
deal with a hurricane, an oil spill, or a terrorist attack govern when dealing 
with a protest that the executive decides warrants emergency action or a 
state of emergency declaration.20 This results in no realistic limit on the 
executive’s power to deal with a purported crisis and no real protection of 
individual liberties. Emergency officials view protests as law-
enforcement-centric events,21 which means that before and after a legal 
emergency is declared, officials give the police free rein to control 
protestors. This makes this expansive emergency management power 
dangerous, as the government equates protestors with a catastrophe and 
provides an executive—and derivatively, the police—the might of the 
state to quell individual protestors in the manner that the same would seek 
to quell a disaster. 
Whenever executives respond to a crisis, they are driven by the need 
to maintain public safety. State constitutions and statutes clarify that the 
rationale for the executives’ crisis and emergency management role stems 
from their duty as protectors of the state and its people.22 Thus, state and 
local officials cite public safety as a justification for state and local crisis 
response.23 The rhetoric of emergency further serves to neutralize 
                                                     
 20. See generally HADDOW ET AL., supra note 16, at chs. 4, 6; CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra 
note 16, at CRS-4; FERRO ET AL., supra note 16. 
 21. I conducted phone interviews with emergency management officials and personnel in July 
2018. These emergency management workers provided me with background and context to 
comprehend generally emergency management structures and mechanisms at the state and local level. 
Any inferences and analysis based on my research and these interviews are attributable completely to 
me and do not represent the opinions of these individuals. On July 1, 2018, I spoke to emergency 
management officials at the Missouri State Emergency Managememt Agency. On July 6, 2018, I spoke 
to an emergency management official at the Baltimore Mayor’s Office of Emergency Managemnet. 
On July 11, 2018, I spoke with an emergency management official at the North Dakota Department of 
Emergency Services. On July 12, 2018, I spoke with an emergency management official at the Virginia 
Department of Emergency Management. On July 16, 2018, I spoke to an attorney within the North 
Carolina Department of Public Safety. Out of respect for the individuals’ privacy, their names have 
been omitted. [hereinafter Interviews] (notes on file with author). 
 22. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The governor shall take care that the laws are distributed and 
faithfully executed, and shall be a conservator of the peace throughout the state.”); N.D. CONST. art. 
V, § 7 (“The governor is the chief executive of the state. The governor shall have the responsibility to 
see that the state’s business is well administered and that its laws are faithfully executed. The governor 
is commander-in-chief of the state’s military forces . . . and the governor may mobilize them to 
execute the laws and maintain order.”); WASH. CONST. art. III, § 8 (“[The governor] shall be 
commander-in-chief of the military in the state except when they shall be called into the service of the 
United States.”). 
 23. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7; Mo. Exec. Order 14-09, supra note 9; N.D. Exec. 
Order 2016-04 (Aug. 19, 2016) [hereinafter N.D. Exec. Order 2016-04] (on file with author). 
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officials’ and police’s behavior that may regularly be perceived by the 
public and the courts as abusive and overreaching. While protection of 
public safety is an important value and an obligation of government, so is 
the protection of constitutional rights. Understanding the difficult tension 
between public safety and individual liberties is a consistent theme in legal 
and social sciences scholarship.24 This examination contributes to that 
discussion where the purported crisis creates an extreme imbalance 
between the government’s interest in maintaining order and individual 
freedom. State emergency constitutional provisions and statutes generally 
make no mention of protection of individual rights.25 This Article 
interjects this concern and inquires how individual liberties are furthered 
or harmed by the state and local executive’s crisis and emergency 
management when responding to public protest. This piece acknowledges 
that there is an important interplay between the state and federal actors in 
the area of emergency management,26 but leaves others to explore that 
relationship. However, scholars have largely ignored the expanse of state 
and local emergency power and the harm that it can do to First and Fourth 
Amendment rights when protestors and community dissent are the 
catastrophe. 
In this exploration, I use as sample narratives the 2016 North Dakota 
oil pipeline protests, the 2014 Ferguson protests, and the 1999 Seattle 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Conference protest. After a brief 
description of the events that precipitated protests in my sample 
jurisdictions in Part I, this Article explains the emergency powers of 
governors and mayors and corresponding emergency management 
structures in Part II. Using evidence from the chosen protest jurisdictions, 
Part III of this Article examines how executive decisions made during 
relevant crisis suppressed protests and violated individuals’ constitutional 
rights, primarily First and Fourth Amendment rights. In Ferguson, first 
responders used oppressive policing tactics before any emergency 
declaration was instituted, thus violating the rights of demonstrators. 
Across the three jurisdictions, however, the executive emergency 
declaration aggravated the use of these oppressive pre-emergency tactics 
                                                     
 24. See, e.g., VICTOR E. KAPPELER & BRIAN P. SCHAEFER, POLICE & SOCIETY: TOUCHSTONE 
READINGS (4th ed. 2019); Angela L. Clark, City of Chicago v. Morales: Sacrificing Individual Liberty 
Interests for Community Safety, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 143–44 (1999); Robert J. Cottrol & 
Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward An Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 
GEO. L.J. 309, 314–15 (1991); Peter W. Neyroud, Balancing Public Safety and Individual Rights in 
Street Policing, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 9231 (2017); V. Plight of the Tempest-Tost: 
Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1915 (2002).  
 25. An exception is the Missouri statute 44.101, which prohibits the state or local authority from 
interfering with an individual’s Second Amendment right to arm themselves during a state of 
emergency. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.101 (2007). 
 26. See, e.g., ABA GUIDE, supra note 16, at 149–60. 
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and opened a Pandora’s box of tools to suppress protest activity. The 
Article then asserts in Part IV that there is no effective legislative or 
judicial check on the executive’s emergency management decisions. 
Lawmakers are unlikely to reign in the executive on behalf of protestors, 
and current judicial review is exceedingly deferential to the executive. 
This Article then suggests a better check on executive crisis and 
emergency actions undertaken in response to mass protest. When the 
protest is the disaster, more robust judicial review of executive emergency 
declarations and the establishment of a council to guide state and local 
executives’ crisis/emergency response are crucial. 
I. SAMPLE NARRATIVES 
The following three sample narratives are intentionally diverse. Each 
of these narratives demonstrate that, regardless of the protest issue or 
whether it is the state or the local executive in charge of the response, the 
emergency mechanisms in place allowed for the serious abridgement of 
protestors’ First and Fourth Amendment rights. I briefly describe them in 
reverse chronological order below, and in Part II, I specifically address 
each jurisdictions’ emergency mechanisms. 
A. The North Dakota Access Pipeline 
At the end of 2014, private company Energy Transfer Partners, and 
later, its subsidiary Dakota Access, began working on its project to build 
a 1,172 mile, thirty-inch underground pipeline to transport crude oil across 
four states from North Dakota to Illinois.27 In April 2016, Native American 
tribes began protesting pipeline construction, citing environmental and 
spiritual objections.28 They also started setting up camps in the area.29 The 
tribes grounded their protests on water contamination and religious 
                                                     
 27. See Company Overview of Dakota Access, LLC, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg. 
com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=264269763 [https://perma.cc/JA4F-UV3U]; 
Madison Park, 5 Things to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline, CNN (Aug. 31, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/31/us/dakota-access-pipeline-explainer/index.html [https://per 
ma.cc/N3VL-RBVM]; see also Ryan W. Miller, How the Dakota Access Pipeline Battle Unfolded, 
USA TODAY (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/12/02/timeline-
dakota-access-pipeline-and-protests/94800796/ [https://perma.cc/X3VF-XN2Y]. 
 28. Lauren Donovan, Sioux Spirit Camp to Protest Dakota Access Pipeline, BISMARCK TRIB. 
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/sioux-spirit-camp-to-protest-
dakota-access-pipeline/article_4773fba1-f3bb-599d-96a4-7d1ddf30690e.html [https://perma.cc/ 
R2ZL-GQMD]. 
 29. Id. 
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concerns associated with the route of the pipeline.30 They asserted their 
duty to guard their ancestral water and land and stressed that they were 
“water protectors” instead of protestors.31 In July 2016, the U.S. Corps of 
Army Engineers approved the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) project.32 
In August, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe sued to prevent the building of 
the pipeline, arguing that the DAPL could potentially contaminate the 
Tribe’s drinking water and damage its historically significant sites.33 That 
same month, opposition intensified,34 the encampment continued,35 and 
North Dakota Governor Jack Dalrymple declared a state of emergency via 
Executive Order (EO) 2016-04, citing “illegal protesting” and “unlawful 
activity” by individuals at the construction site.36 The order referenced the 
right to protest, as well as the need to enforce “the rule of law.”37 
                                                     
 30. Lauren Donovan, Spiritual, Political Ride Protests Pipeline, BISMARCK TRIB. (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/spiritual-political-ride-protests-
pipeline/article_e9038f1b-e6d4-5d77-9203-f9a3234af3e6.html [https://perma.cc/97M6-YRVH]. 
 31. See Iyuskin American Horse, ‘We Are Protectors, Not Protesters’: Why I’m Fighting the 
North Dakota Pipeline, GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/aug/18/north-dakota-pipeline-activists-bakken-oil-fields [https://perma.cc/C6TL-NE32]. 
 32. See Park, supra note 27; Company Overview of Dakota Access, supra note 27. 
 33. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–3, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. 
U.S. Army of Corps Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. July 27, 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-01534-JEB). 
The suit alleged violations of several historic preservation and environmental protection laws in the 
Corps’ issuance of final permits for the construction of 1,168-mile-long pipeline meant to transport 
crude oil from North Dakota to Illinois. The tribe alleged that no adequate environmental analysis of 
the project had been conducted, despite the high probability of leaks which would impact numerous 
communities and waterways along the route. The project stopped and started several times due to 
changes in federal administration, finally culminating with the granting of a controversial easement 
under Lake Oahe by the Trump administration. On June 14, 2017, Judge James Boasberg declared the 
permits “did not adequately consider the impacts of an oil spill on fishing rights, hunting rights, or 
environmental justice, or the degree to which the pipeline’s effects are likely to be highly 
controversial.” Michael Kennedy, The Dakota Access Pipeline, EARTH JUST. (2017), 
https://earthjustice.org/cases/2016/the-dakota-access-pipeline [https://perma.cc/LV78-C7X3]. 
Despite this ruling, on August 31, 2018, the Corps affirmed the permits. The tribe continued to 
challenge the project by filing a supplemental complaint on November 1, 2018. Jan Hasselman, The 
Renewed Legal Challenges Against the Dakota Access Pipeline, EARTH JUST. (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://earthjustice.org/features/explainer-renewed-legal-challenge-dakota-access 
[https://perma.cc/MLN7-SX33]. 
 34. See Catherine Thorbecke, Timeline of Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, ABC NEWS (Oct. 
28, 2016), https://abcnews.go.com/US/timeline-dakota-access-pipeline-protests/story?id=43131355 
[https://perma.cc/23SJ-WDQY]; see also Alexander Sammon, A History of Native Americans 
Protesting the Dakota Access Pipeline, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.motherjones. 
com/environment/2016/09/dakota-access-pipeline-protest-timeline-sioux-standing-rock-jill-stein/ 
[https://perma.cc/2S8N-DJL3]; Complaint at 5–9, Dakota Access, LLC v. Archambault et al., No. 
1:16-cv-296, 2016 WL 5107005 (D.N.D. Aug. 15, 2016). 
 35. See supra note 34. 
 36. N.D. Exec. Order 2016-04, supra note 23. 
 37. Id. 
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A month later, the Governor sent National Guard soldiers to the area 
in preparation for a court ruling on whether to permit a challenge to 
pipeline construction.38 Protests and arrests continued and magnified. 
After the Army Corps issued an eviction notice,39 the Governor issued EO 
2016-08 mandating evacuation citing dangerous winter storm conditions 
and sanitation;40 however, he did not evacuate the encampment at that 
time.41 Water protectors were, however, evacuated after the Governor’s 
next evacuation order via EO 2017-01 in February 2017. This last order 
cited snow melt and flooding risks.42 Over 750 people were arrested over 
approximately ten months in the pipeline protests.43 
B. Ferguson 
In the summer of 2014, white Police Officer Darren Wilson shot 18-
year-old Michael Brown, a black teenager, at noontime in the streets of 
Ferguson, Missouri. After the shooting, the teenager’s body lay face down 
on the street for about four hours, bleeding from at least six gunshot 
wounds.44 During this time, a shocked neighborhood poured onto the street 
asking questions, taking videos of the scene, posting about the incident on 
social media, and calling local news outlets.45 In the days following the 
                                                     
 38. North Dakota Governor Calls in the National Guard Ahead of Pipeline Ruling, REUTERS 
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pipeline-nativeamericans/north-dakota-
governor-calls-in-national-guard-ahead-of-pipeline-ruling-idUSKCN11F031 [https://perma.cc/VQ 
A5-EY8W]; Guard Soldiers Activated Amid Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, ARMY TIMES (Sept. 8, 
2016), https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2016/09/08/guard-soldiers-activated-amid-
dakota-access-pipeline-protests/ [https://perma.cc/GCA8-2NJ3] (reporting that while the Governor 
only sent two dozen troops into the area, another 100 were on standby). 
 39. Letter from John W. Henderson, Dist. Commander, Army Corps of Eng’rs, to Dave 
Archambault II, Chairman, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www. 
indianz.com/News/2016/11/28/armycorps112516.pdf. 
 40. N.D. Exec. Order 2016-08 (Nov. 28, 2016) [hereinafter N.D. Exec. Order 2016-08]. 
 41. Theresa Braine, DAPL: Evacuation Orders and Snowflakes Fly as Injured Water Protectors 
Sue Morton County, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Nov. 29, 2016), https://indiancountrymedia 
network.com/news/politics/dapl-evacuation-orders-and-snowflakes-fly-as-injured-water-protectors-
sue-morton-county [https://perma.cc/B5J5-HNA3]. 
 42. See N.D. Exec. Order 2017-01 (Feb. 15, 2017) [hereinafter N.D. Exec. Order 2017-01]; see 
also David Kaplan, North Dakota Governor Issues Emergency Evacuation Order for Dakota Access 
Pipeline Protest Camp, ABC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/US/north-dakota-
governor-issues-emergency-evacuation-order-dakota/story?id=45522458 [https://perma.cc/45PF-
T59P]. 
 43. Cliff Naylor, Growth of DAPL Protests Much Bigger than Expected, YOUR NEWS LEADER 
(Feb. 23, 2018), http://www.kfyrtv.com/content/news/Growth-of-DAPL-protests-much-bigger-than-
expected-475002913.html [https://perma.cc/V6VS-8YGA]. 
 44. Julie Bosman & Joseph Goldstein, Timeline for a Body: 4 Hours in the Middle of a Ferguson 
Street, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/us/michael-brown-a-
bodys-timeline-4-hours-on-a-ferguson-street.html [https://perma.cc/E2WJ-6CTM]. 
 45. Id. 
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shooting, activists joined residents and large-scale demonstrations 
began.46 In the streets of Ferguson, the community, outraged observers, 
and activists protested not only the death of Michael Brown, but also the 
epidemic of police killings of unarmed black and brown people, police 
brutality, and the structural racism of the criminal system.47 
Within a week of the shooting, the Governor declared a state of 
emergency via EO 14-08, prompted by what he termed “lawlessness” and 
“civil unrest.”48 Two days later, the Governor extended EO 14-08 and 
issued a state of emergency throughout Missouri.49 This extended EO 
referenced protection not only of the “rule of law” but also of civil rights 
and the right to peacefully assemble and protest; it omitted the term “civil 
unrest” in favor of “conditions of distress.”50 Nevertheless, the Order 
imposed a curfew within Ferguson “under the terms and conditions as 
deemed necessary by the . . . State Highway Patrol.”51 
As further examination will reveal, while the text in the order gave a 
nod to civil liberties, the repercussion of the declaration was suppression 
of individual liberties.52 The midnight to five a.m. curfew lasted for two 
days until lifted by the Governor.53 On the same day he lifted the curfew, 
the Governor issued EO 14-09.54 The order called the state National Guard 
“to protect life and property” and “support civilian authorities.”55 Further, 
it expressly permitted the Highway Patrol to “restrict[] and/or clos[e] 
streets and thoroughfares in the City of Ferguson.”56 The National Guard 
was active in Ferguson streets for eight days.57 During the initial Ferguson 
uprising in August and early September, police arrested about 300 
people.58 The Governor terminated the state of emergency on September 
                                                     
 46. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at xiii. 
 47. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 6; see also Emanuella Grinberg, What 
#Ferguson Stands for Besides Michael Brown and Darren Wilson, CNN (Nov. 19, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/19/us/ferguson-social-media-injustice/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
J2BR-7YMR]. 
 48. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7; Press Release, Office of Mo. Governor Jay Nixon, 
Statement from Gov. Nixon Regarding the Ongoing Situation in Ferguson and Role of National Guard 
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://wayback.archive-it.org/8248/20170107212451/https://governor.mo.gov 
/news/archive/statement-gov-nixon-regarding-ongoing-situation-ferguson-and-role-national-guard 
[https://perma.cc/6PYS-S98Q]. 
 49. See Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.; see also DOJ FERGUSON REP, supra note 5, at 24. 
 52. See infra Part III. 
 53. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 26. 
 54. Mo. Exec. Order 14-09, supra note 9. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Mo. Exec. Order 14-10 (Sept. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Mo. Exec. Order 14-10]. 
 58. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 38. 
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3rd.59 All in all, there was a governor-declared state of emergency in 
Missouri for almost twenty days in the summer of 2014. 
On November 17, 2014, the Governor again declared a state of 
emergency in anticipation of the grand jury decision of whether to indict 
Officer Wilson.60 He cited a “possibility of expanded unrest.”61 The 
Governor summoned 2,200 National Guard troops to Ferguson62 and gave 
primary responsibility for protest policing to the St. Louis County Police 
Department—instead of the Ferguson police.63 Protestors criticized the 
preemptive gubernatorial emergency for equating protest activity with 
violence.64 When the grand jury did not indict Officer Wilson,65 protests 
spread throughout the St. Louis area.66 On the day prosecutors announced 
the grand jury no bill, police arrested eighty people.67 In the days after the 
grand jury decision, law enforcement responded again by violently 
suppressing activists’ constitutional liberties.68 The Governor set the state 
of emergency to automatically terminate within thirty days of his 
November 17th order.69 
C. 1999 WTO in Seattle 
On November 30, 1999, Seattle hosted the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Conference. Activists with diverse concerns relating to economic, 
                                                     
 59. Mo. Exec. Order 14-10, supra note 57. 
 60. Mo. Exec. Order 14-14 (Nov. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Mo. Exec. Order 14-14]. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Ellen Wulfhorst, Daniel Wallis & Edward McAllister, More Than 400 Arrested as Ferguson 
Protests Spread to Other U.S. Cities, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-missouri-shooting/more-than-400-arrested-as-ferguson-protests-spread-to-other-u-s-cities-
idUSKCN0J80PR20141126 [https://perma.cc/J7GW-Y5QW]. 
 63. Mo. Exec. Order 14-14, supra note 60; see also Mariano Castillo & Dana Ford, Missouri 
Governor Declares a State of Emergency in Ferguson, CNN (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www. 
cnn.com/2014/11/17/us/ferguson-state-of-emergency/index.html [https://perma.cc/3KCL-DRRK]. 
 64. Monica Davey, State of Emergency Declared in Missouri for Grand Jury’s Decision on 
Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/us/missouri-governor-
calls-out-national-guard-ahead-of-grand-jury-decision.html [https://perma.cc/4G3T-6EEL]. 
 65. Colleen Shalby, Protestors React to Ferguson Grand Jury Decision Not to Indict Darren 
Wilson, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/follow-reaction-
ferguson-grand-jury-decision [https://perma.cc/M54B-VEAT]. 
 66. Alan Scher Zagier, Andale Gross, Jim Suhr, & Catherine Lucey, 61 Arrested in Ferguson 
After Grand Jury Declines to Indict Police Officer in Michael Brown’s Death, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.dailynews.com/2014/11/24/61-arrested-in-ferguson-after-grand-jury-
declines-to-indict-police-officer-in-michael-browns-death/ [https://perma.cc/8CWU-BPLR]. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Complaint at 9–26, Templeton v. Dotson, No. 4:14-cv-2019, 2015 WL 13650910 (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 8, 2014). 
 69. Mo. Exec. Order 14-14, supra note 60. 
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environmental, and social issues descended upon the city in protest.70 On 
the afternoon of the WTO Conference, Seattle Mayor Paul Schell declared 
a state of emergency in the city, which instituted a curfew and an extensive 
“no-protest” zone.71 After the declaration, the Governor immediately 
called in 300 state troopers and National Guard troops to assist the Seattle 
Police Department with the protest.72 Ultimately, the mayor terminated the 
emergency on December 4th. About 500 activists were arrested on 
November 30th and December 1st.73 
These three sample narratives are applied in the forthcoming 
analyses. In the next Part, I will explain state and local emergency 
mechanisms generally, as well as specifically in these three jurisdictions. 
II. EXPLANATION OF STATE AND LOCAL EMERGENCY POWER AND 
BUREAUCRACY 
When a crisis occurs within a state, state and local officials are the 
first responders who are responsible for managing and controlling the 
situation. The U.S. Constitution and federal statutes prevent the national 
government from interfering or assisting with a state level emergency 
without a preceding request of the state,74 so in the majority of situations, 
the national executive will not be involved in the management of a 
state-level emergency. All state constitutions contain provisions making 
the governor the commander-in-chief of the state military with the power 
of maintaining the peace, suppressing insurrection, or both.75 These 
                                                     
 70. World Trade Organization Protests in Seattle, SEATTLE MUN. ARCHIVES, http://www. 
seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-and-education/digital-document-libraries/world-trade-organization-
protests-in-seattle [https://perma.cc/9YHM-R4A5]. 
 71. Mayoral Proclamation of Civil Emergency, City of Seattle Resolution 30099, Exhibit A 
(Dec. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Seattle Emergency Proclamation], https://www.seattle.gov/Documents 
/Departments/CityArchive/DDL/WTO/1999Dec6.htm [https://perma.cc/YDW4-9KSC]. 
 72. Day Two, November 30, 1999, WTO HISTORY PROJECT, http://depts.washington.edu 
/wtohist/day2.htm [https://perma.cc/R6FN-XJZS]. 
 73. Id. 
 74. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (containing the “Guaranty Clause,” which delineates that the federal 
government will protect states against “domestic Violence,” upon an “Application of the [state] 
Legislature, or of the Executive”); 10 U.S.C. § 251 (2017) (requiring there be a state request before 
the federal government assists in a state emergency); William B. Fisch, Emergency in the 
Constitutional Law of the United States, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 389, 410–11 (1990) (stating that 
federal intervention before such a state request may amount to a Guaranty Clause violation, unless the 
state is acting in violation of federal law); see also HADDOW ET AL., supra note 16, at xvi. 
 75. See CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 20, at CRS-4; FERRO ET AL., supra note 16, at 41; 
see also MO. CONST. art. IV (making the governor the “conservator of the peace” with the authority 
to use the state militia to “suppress and actual and prevent threatened insurrection, and repeal 
invasion.”); N.D. CONST. art V, § 7 (making the governor the commander in chief of the military with 
the authority to “mobilize them to . . . maintain order”); N.D. CONST. art. III, § 8 (making the governor 
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provisions are the foundation of the governor’s emergency power. State 
legislatures have further enacted statutes that provide contour to 
emergency management powers and structures. Municipal ordinances 
provide local executives with similar powers.76 During a crisis, safety is 
the dominating concern for the executive and his77 emergency 
management team. In this calculus, protection of constitutional liberties is 
not an emergency management priority. A review through state 
constitutions and statutes dealing with emergencies demonstrates that no 
provision exists for the protection of individual rights.78 The language of 
state emergency constitutional and statutory provisions—as well as the 
resulting emergency management structures—reflect the goal of guarding 
security, not individual liberties. The incentive might be different when 
some local politicians draft emergency provisions, possibly resulting from 
local residents having a stronger influence on these officials. After the 
1999 WTO protests, a civil rights provision was added to the Seattle 
Municipal Code requiring the mayor to include language in the emergency 
declaration that states that any intrusions on individual rights are the least 
restrictive necessary to protect life and property.79 
In terms of structure, state and local jurisdictions have an emergency 
management bureaucracy which answers to the governor or the local 
executive, respectively.80 Understanding these bureaucracies and how they 
operate when there is a crisis is a challenge. Publicly available materials 
on state and local emergency management are limited and do not present 
a clear picture of how these officials interact with state and local elected 
executives during a crisis. Therefore, my understanding of emergency 
                                                     
the commander-in-chief of the state military); N.D. CONST. art. X, § 2 (specifying that the governor 
can utilize the militia to “suppress insurrections and repel invasions”). 
 76. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.010 (1973) (prior to amendments). 
 77. I intentionally utilize the male pronoun when referencing state and local executives. I do this 
because most are cis male and therefore—in most cases—cis male governors, mayors, and the like 
will decide how to manage the crisis as they did in my sample narratives. Governors, NAT’L 
GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/governors-2/ [https://perma.cc/5FMW-22GQ] (providing a 
comprehensive list of the U.S.’s governors, ten of whom are female and forty-five of whom are male). 
 78. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT § 44.101 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-29 (2013). One 
exception is that Missouri forbids firearm restrictions during an emergency. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.101 
(2007). West Virginia also has a similar statute. W. VA. CODE § 15-5-19A (2014). 
 79. See Seattle, Wash., City Council No. 113809, Ordinance No. 120606 (codified at SEATTLE, 
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.025 (2001)), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~scripts/nph-brs.exe? 
s3=&s4=120606&s5=&s1=&s2=&S6=&Sect4=AND&l=0&Sect2=THESON&Sect3=PLURON&Se
ct5=CBORY&Sect6=HITOFF&d=ORDF&p=1&u=%2F~public%2Fcbor1.htm&r=1&f=G [https:// 
perma.cc/3CJG-S9SJ]. 
 80. CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 16, at CRS-4–7; see FEMA EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, Unit Two: How Communities and States Deal with Emergencies and 
Disasters, in A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO DISASTER ASSISTANCE 2-1, 2-2 (2001), https://training. 
fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is7unit_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CFX-R5PF]. 
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management mechanisms is derived from not only my review of statutes, 
reports, and materials, but also from my interviews of emergency 
management officials and personnel in multiple jurisdictions.81 While 
these structures are not uniform across states, generalities do exist. Within 
each state executive itself, there is a state emergency management office 
headed by either a civilian or the Adjutant General.82 This office may be 
situated within a different agency in each state—but is always a part of the 
executive bureaucracy.83 Cities have an analogous emergency 
management bureaucracy under the control of the chief local executive.84 
The role of these offices and their personnel is to coordinate crisis or 
emergency response under the direction of the state or local chief 
executive.85 My discussions with these emergency management officials 
confirmed their focus on public safety, as opposed to any individual liberty 
concerns—even when the conversation turned to protest response.86 Law 
enforcement is an integral part of state and local emergency management 
and officials are routinely the first responders to protests.87 
State and local emergency forces—i.e., police—do not await an 
emergency declaration to exert substantial control over protestors. Before 
a legal emergency, police activate mutual aid agreements to summon 
police from other intra-state jurisdictions.88 This acts as a multiplier to 
regular police forces. In Ferguson, local police activated these agreements 
                                                     
 81. Interviews, supra note 21. 
 82. See CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 16, at CRS-4–5; see also HADDOW ET AL., supra 
note 16, at 106. 
 83. HADDOW ET AL., supra note 16, at 106. 
 84. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.047 (2015) (describing Seattle’s Office of 
Emergency Management). 
 85. CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 16, at CRS-4. About thirty states also have created a 
commission. Id. These commissions’ purported role is to provide the governor with advice on how to 
prepare for and handle an emergency. Id. In my conversations with emergency management officials, 
however, I learned that these commissions are not involved in efforts during an actual crisis, but they 
may instead provide feedback after the event. See Interviews, supra note 21; see also State Emergency 
Response Commission, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, https://www.ncdps. 
gov/about-dps/boards-commissions/state-emergency-response-commission [https://perma.cc/6ZBA-
6XJS]. In North Dakota, the Emergency Commission’s role is also budgetary. See Emergency 
Commission, N. D. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, https://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/64-2015/committees/ 
joint/emergency-commission [https://perma.cc/8QV9-UVVU]. During DAPL protests, the 
commission met twice to approve funding requests related to protest policing. See Minutes, Special 
Emergency Commission Meeting (Nov. 1, 2016), https://sos.nd.gov/files/uploaded_documents/ecm 
nnov012016special.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQN6-K7BT]; see also Minutes, Emergency Commission 
Meeting (Nov. 30, 2016), https://sos.nd.gov/files/uploaded_documents/ecmn11302016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MF27-5G3X]. In some states like Missouri and Virginia, the commission has a 
specialized focus like environmental hazards. Interviews, supra note 21. 
 86. Interviews, supra note 21. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.; see also FERRO ET AL., supra note 16, at 47–51. 
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early—before any emergency declaration.89 Police can don military garb 
and weapons, ride atop military-grade vehicles, and use them to break up 
protests like they did in Ferguson during the seven days leading up to the 
gubernatorial emergency declaration.90 Police can use existing law to 
arrest. So, while police have some of the same weapons available to battle 
civilians whether or not there is an emergency, they are not as likely to use 
them as flagrantly and excessively as when there is a sense of an 
impending crisis (whether real or fabricated). In other words, without 
downplaying the regular police abuse and violence, it is difficult to 
imagine police routinely riding down American city streets in military 
tanks and tear gassing civilians without the rhetoric of emergency in the 
air. The rhetoric neutralizes abusive police conduct because it is perceived 
as necessary to emergency management. 
The declaration of an emergency further expands executive power 
and aggravates the use of oppressive policing tools.91 The statutes and 
factual narratives from our sample jurisdictions demonstrate this. During 
an emergency, the Missouri and North Dakota governors can single-
handedly control all emergency forces;92 suspend laws and statutes;93 seize 
or control modes of transportation;94 control access to emergency areas;95 
take and utilize private property;96 and activate the state’s National 
Guard.97 Notably, the emergency statutes do not contain an exhaustive list 
of the governor’s constitutional power since the language in each statute 
clearly states that it is not meant to define or otherwise cabin the extent of 
constitutional gubernatorial emergency authority.98 In Seattle, the mayor 
has analogous power: he can prescribe a curfew; order evacuation; require 
the closing of private businesses, particularly those selling liquor and 
firearms; restrict or close access to public streets and places; and generally 
make any orders “as are imminently necessary for the protection of life 
                                                     
 89. Compare DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 5 tbl.1 (indicating St. Louis police called for 
mutual aid the same day Michael Brown was shot on August 9, 2014), with Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, 
supra note 7 (declaring first state of emergency in response to protests on August 16, 2014). 
 90. See generally DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at ch.2; Interviews, supra note 21. 
 91. State constitutions also grant the governor the power to declare martial law, which is a more 
extreme action. Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49 A.F. L. REV. 
67, 85 n.93 (2000) (stating “martial law has been imposed on the state level on numerous occasions”). 
However, an analysis of martial law is outside the scope of this paper and was not declared in any of 
our sample narratives. 
 92. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100(3)(a) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(5) (2013). 
 93. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.022(3)(1) (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(6) (2013). 
 94. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100(3)(c)(a) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(6)(f) (2013). 
 95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17-1.05 (6)(g) (2013). 
 96. See MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100 (3)(c) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(6) (2013). 
 97. MO. REV. STAT. § 41.480 (1951); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(6), (8) (2013). 
 98. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.032(8) (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-171-03(4) (1985). 
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and property.”99 However, only a governor can activate the National Guard 
as its commander.100 
During an emergency, executive orders are the law of the land.101 
Police arrest for failure to abide by ad hoc emergency rules, since 
noncompliance is criminal—this includes protesting past curfew, 
demonstrating or even stepping outside a designated protest zone, or, in 
Ferguson, standing still for longer than five seconds.102 In Missouri, as in 
Seattle during the WTO protest, nonadherence to the order is a criminal 
misdemeanor that can subject someone to a fine or one year in jail.103 In 
North Dakota, nonadherence is a fineable criminal infraction.104 The 
governor has the authority to declare a state of emergency unilaterally 
across his state when his focus is public safety.105 In most states, this power 
belongs only to the governor. Missouri—where Ferguson is located—is 
one of the exceptions where the legislature can also proclaim an 
emergency.106 In the few states where the legislative branch can likewise 
institute an emergency, lawmakers rarely, if ever, utilize this power.107 
This does not mean that most state statutes do not allow for any legislative 
involvement in an emergency. In both Missouri and North Dakota, as well 
as in twenty-eight other states, the legislature can terminate the 
                                                     
 99. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.020(O) (1992) (prior to amendments). 
 100. Interviews, supra note 21; see also MAJ. GEN. TIMOTHY J. LOWENBERG, THE ROLE OF THE 
NATIONAL GUARD IN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY 2 (2014). 
 101. See MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100(3)(b) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05 (2013). 
 102. See infra Part III. 
 103. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.130(2) (1955) (“Any person violating any rule or regulation adopted 
under this law after it has become effective during an emergency or any person or officer violating 
any provision of this law shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 558.011(6)–
(8) (2017) (stating that the term of imprisonment for misdemeanors is “not to exceed one year”); see 
also SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 10.02.110 (1973) (prior to amendments), 12A.26.040 
(2001). The penalty for failure to obey a mayoral emergency order is now 180 days in jail. SEATTLE, 
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.110 (2015) (as amended by City of Seattle Ordinance No. 124849). 
 104. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 37-17.1-05(7), 12.1-32-01(7) (2017) (defining penalty for 
criminal infraction). 
 105. NAT’L EMERGENCY MGMT. ASS’N, 2018 BIENNIAL REPORT 3 (2018) [hereinafter NEMA 
Report]. Even before the triggering event has occurred, every state governor, with the exception of 
Minnesota, can declare an emergency also for an impending incident. Id.; see also CRS REPORT 
SUMMARY, supra note 16, at CRS-4. 
 106. See MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100(1) (2008) (stating that an emergency “may be 
proclaimed…by resolution of the legislature.”). The state legislatures of Alabama, Missouri, North 
Carolina, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and West Virginia also have the power 
to proclaim an emergency. See ALA. CODE §31-9-8(a) (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. §414.070 (2009); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:45(2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.20(a) (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. § 
683.9 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 15-5-6 (2014). 
 107. In 2017, the 206 state level emergencies were all gubernatorial declarations. NEMA Report, 
supra note 105, at 3. 
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emergency, even if it cannot initiate it.108 In some states, a governor’s 
emergency declaration must be continued by the legislature after a certain 
                                                     
 108. State legislatures can terminate the emergency in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. § 26.23.025 
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(1984); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-107 (West 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100.1 (2008); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-3-303 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-829.40 (2019); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 414.070 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:45 (2019); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a (McKinney 
2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.20 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05 (2013); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 63, § 683.9 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 401.192 (2009); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301 
(West 2014); 30 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 30-15-9 (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-2a-206 (West 
2013); W.VA. CODE § 15-5-6 (2014); WIS. STAT. § 166.03 (2009); see also KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL32288, ALASKA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL32289, ARIZONA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY 
AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-4 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21784, 
COLORADO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21801, 
CONNECTICUT EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21784, FLORIDA 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at 
CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21800, GEORGIA EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 
(2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21780, IDAHO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA 
ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21781, INDIANA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND 
SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS21782, IOWA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS21788, KANSAS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY 
AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter KAN. CRS REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL., 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32678, LOUISIANA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND 
SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-4 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS21927, MAINE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS21929, MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY 
AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32318, 
MISSOURI EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter MO. CRS REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL32319, MONTANA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY 
AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21789, 
NEBRASKA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32320, NEVADA 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at 
CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter NEV. CRS REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS21790, NEW HAMPSHIRE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY 
AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter N.H. CRS REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL., 
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duration.109 None of the state legislatures in the sample jurisdictions had 
any involvement with emergency management during the relevant 
protests. 
Whether the Missouri and North Dakota governors complied with 
their respective statutes when declaring the relevant emergency is 
questionable. In Missouri, an emergency is defined as “any state of 
emergency declared by proclamation by the governor . . . upon the actual 
occurrence of a natural or man-made disaster of major 
proportions . . . when the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the state 
is jeopardized.”110 Although the statute references a “disaster of major 
proportions,” no provision requires the governor to provide any evidence 
of the emergency. The circumstances in Missouri at the time of the 
emergency declaration did not amount to a “disaster of major proportions.” 
Although some civilians acted violently against police in the streets of 
Ferguson, the overwhelming majority of protestors were peaceful.111 
                                                     
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32332, NEW YORK EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND 
SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS21797, NORTH CAROLINA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND 
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(2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., RL32330, PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (Mar. 23, 2004); 
KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21873, RHODE ISLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
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ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32405, UTAH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND 
SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-2 (2004) [hereinafter UTAH CRS 
REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32559, WEST VIRGINIA EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004) 
[hereinafter W.VA. CRS REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21879, WISCONSIN 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at 
CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter WIS. CRS REPORT]. 
 109. The legislatures in Kansas, Michigan, Utah, and Wisconsin need to extend the emergency 
after certain period. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-924 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.403 (2002); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-2a-206 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 166.03 (2009); see also KAN. CRS REPORT, 
supra note 108, at CRS-3; KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32326, MICHIGAN 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at 
CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter MICH. CRS REPORT]; UTAH CRS REPORT, supra note 108, at CRS-2; WIS. 
CRS REPORT, supra note 108, at CRS-3. 
 110. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.010(6) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 111. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 7 (“The vast majority of those 
participating in the protests around Michael Brown’s death have been peaceful—as noted by 
government officials such as the President of the United States, the Governor of Missouri and Attorney 
General along with the Missouri Highway Patrol.”). 
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Admittedly, there were large crowds, some looting, and police reports of 
gun shots—although no shots were fired at police or any other 
individual.112 The situation was certainly serious, but not a major disaster. 
As discussed later in this Article, the police response was militaristic from 
the day of Michael Brown’s shooting.113 The appearance of war on the 
ground likely contributed to the crisis atmosphere; Americans are not 
accustomed to seeing tanks on city streets. Still, this last circumstance was 
created by law enforcement—not civilians or protestors—and thus should 
not factor into the declaration. Instead of citing the “disaster of major 
proportions” language, the governor stated in his emergency executive 
order that “events occurring in the City of Ferguson . . . have created 
conditions of distress for the citizens and businesses of that 
community.”114 This is a far cry from a major disaster. Nevertheless, the 
citizenry did not bring a court challenge to the emergency declaration. This 
is not because all agreed with the governor’s actions,115 instead it is likely 
because there is no mechanism to meaningfully challenge a gubernatorial 
emergency declaration. This is because the declaration receives highly 
deferential review, established by precedents in the courts, and is de facto 
not constrained by state legislatures. I will discuss both of these points 
later in this Article.116 
On the other hand, North Dakota defines an emergency as “any 
situation determined by the governor to require . . . response or mitigation 
actions to protect lives and property, to provide public health and safety, 
or to avert or lessen the threat of disaster.”117 A plain reading of this 
definition suggests that the governor’s perception completely dictates 
whether an emergency exists in the state. Thus, the emergency is in the 
eyes of the governor beholder. However, the emergency statute does 
require the North Dakota governor to specify the affected areas; the nature 
and incidents leading to the emergency; and what conditions, once 
satisfied, would result in the emergency’s termination.118 In the North 
Dakota Governor’s EO declaring the emergency, he specified the location 
as the Southwest and South Central regions of the state and generally 
referenced “illegal” and “unlawful activity” and “illegal protesting 
                                                     
 112. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 6–19. 
 113. Infra Section III(b). 
 114. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7. 
 115. Alice Speri, State of Emergency and Curfew in Ferguson After Tensions Flare Again, VICE 
(Aug. 16, 2014), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/9kvmx8/state-of-emergency-and-curfew-in-
ferguson-after-tensions-flare-again [https://perma.cc/RU3Q-6W5V]. 
 116. Infra Sections IV(a), IV(b). 
 117. N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-04(4) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. 
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activity.”119 This conclusory language likely does not satisfy the statute’s 
requirement that the executive include the relevant incidents. Further, 
there was no mention of what conditions would lead to termination of the 
emergency, which begs how the target of the emergency—water 
protectors—would know what circumstances would lead to the lifting of 
the emergency order. Like the Missouri emergency executive orders, there 
was no legal challenge to the pipeline emergency order. 
Local executives often can also declare an emergency within their 
jurisdiction—although their authority may be more limited. In response to 
the WTO protests, it was the Seattle mayor who declared an emergency in 
the city.120 Seattle’s list of what can lead to a mayoral emergency 
declaration is broad: natural disasters, “riot, unlawful assembly, 
insurrection, other disturbance, [or]the imminent threat thereof . . . .”121 
Much like the Missouri and North Dakota provisions, it relies on the 
judgment of the executive that “extraordinary measures” are needed to 
ward off damage to life, property, and maintain “public peace . . . [and] 
welfare.”122 However, the Seattle mayor’s emergency declaration required 
prompt City Council ratification—which he received.123 Although the City 
Council needs to agree with the declaration in Seattle, it is the mayor’s 
sole judgment that initially determines whether the declaration is 
warranted. 
While the governor—and, at times, a local executive—has unilateral 
power to declare an emergency, this does not mean that he reaches this 
decision without any advice or influence of other state management 
officials, or that the top executive only becomes involved in crisis 
management when deciding whether to declare an emergency. Instead 
governors and local executives are involved in an information loop with 
first responders and other emergency management officials from the 
moment there is a concern about a potential crisis.124 My conversations 
with emergency management officials provided an insider’s view into who 
                                                     
 119. N.D. Exec. Order 2016-04, supra note 23. 
 120. Seattle Emergency Proclamation, supra note 71, at Exhibit A. Because they were mayoral 
emergency declarations in Seattle, the declarations needed to and were ratified by the City Council of 
the City of Seattle. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE §10.02.010(c) (1973) (prior to 
amendments); see also FERRO ET AL., supra note 16, at 17. 
 121. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.010 (1973) (prior to amendments). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See City of Seattle Resolution 30099 (Dec. 6, 1999) (enacted) 
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/CityArchive/DDL/WTO/1999Dec6.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5J4N-D748]; see also SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.010(c) (1973) 
(prior to amendments). Even if the City Council voids or changes the declaration, the rejection does 
not affect the propriety of emergency actions taken before its rejection. Id. 
 124. Interviews, supra note 21. 
22 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:1 
feeds this information loop during mass protests. Top law enforcement 
agents base their perspectives on their officers’ accounts of engagement 
with protestors in the field.125 Law enforcement officials feed this 
information loop and thus frame the top executive’s perception of the crisis 
and of the appropriate response. Police are unlikely to provide a neutral 
account of protest events—their accounts are particularly likely to be 
biased in the circumstances of Ferguson, where protestors are objecting to 
police conduct and violence. Even when the protest does not revolve 
around police, law enforcement is trained to view protestors through a lens 
of threat assessment where protestors are labeled as the enemy to be 
quashed.126 Police interests will be maintenance of public order, at best—
suppression of dissent, at worst. Therefore, top emergency management 
executives and personnel will not act to protect the rights of protestors 
when they receive one-sided biased information and relevant statutory 
provisions ignore constitutional protections. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PROTESTORS OF STATE AND 
LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
This Part uses the emergency narratives to demonstrate how the 
government’s crisis response suppressed protest activities and infringed 
on the First and Fourth Amendment rights of protestors and dissenting 
community members. In the three cases, the governor or the mayor 
declared a legal emergency.127 My investigation shows that the 
government viewed the mass protests as a crisis and acted to maintain 
order without true regard for constitutional liberties both before and, more 
egregiously, after the emergency declaration. My objective is to interject 
the protection of constitutional liberties as a measuring stick of the 
government response. Where government actors’ preeminent value is 
public safety, protection of constitutional liberties is conversely 
undervalued. 
Even when the language in the executive orders provided lip service 
to the right to gather and protest, as did the orders in Missouri and North 
Dakota,128 governmental actions hindered these activities. Government 
directives undertaken in the name of order and safety—when mass dissent 
is the purported crisis—suppress protest activity. These actions most 
clearly implicate the First Amendment freedom of speech and assembly 
and the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches 
                                                     
 125. Id. 
 126. WOOD, supra note 18, at 125. 
 127. See supra Part I. 
 128. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7; Mo. Exec. Order 14-10, supra note 57; Mo. Exec. 
Order 14-14, supra note 60; N.D. Exec. Order 2016-04, supra note 23. 
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and seizures. The accounts below show law enforcement acting in crisis 
and, subsequently, emergency mode to maintain or regain control and 
order without regard to constitutional liberties. The First and Fourth 
Amendment rights of protestors were not an actual part of the equation for 
the executive, emergency management officials, and much less police on 
the ground. 
For the purposes of this discussion, I define threats to the First 
Amendment as limitations on the right of assembly and individual 
expression.129 This includes limitations on people’s ability to freely 
congregate and protest. I define threats to the Fourth Amendment as 
government interference with an individual’s physical freedom.130 This 
includes detention, arrests, excessive use of force, and intrusive searches. 
The other value, of course, is public safety—which the executive may 
perceive as having an inverse relationship with individuals’ constitutional 
freedoms.131 Through these narratives, harm to First and Fourth 
Amendment rights is obvious through government use of excessive and 
militarized force, arbitrary and mass arrests, protest zones, curfews, and 
ad hoc emergency rules and practices. While some of the problematic 
government action resulted in lawsuits, Part IV will discuss why litigation 
is an incomplete remedy. 
In this Part, I discuss patterns of government conduct across my 
selected emergency jurisdictions that impinged on the First and Fourth 
Amendment. Before any emergency, the executive can use its regular 
police power to arrest under existing criminal laws and summon police 
reinforcements from within the state. Surprisingly, it can also use military 
tools, weapons, and garb for policing and restrict where individuals can 
protest to certain streets. Thus, even before the legal emergency, the 
executive can, and sometimes does, use its extraordinary policing 
authority during a purported crisis, causing harm to protestors’ liberties as 
                                                     
 129. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 130. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 131. I will resist the temptation to speculate about how public safety was affected by the 
government’s constitutionally problematic use of emergency power. I do not know whether people 
and property were safer because of the government’s actions in the sample narratives. I can only point 
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ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL 11 (Sept. 14, 2000) 
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MISCONDUCT 1, 6 (2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/iachr_statement 
_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3HN-WXM4]; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on her Mission to the United States of America, 15, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/46/Add.1 (Aug. 9, 2017). 
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I demonstrate in my discussion of police conduct prior to the governor’s 
emergency declaration in Ferguson. After an emergency declaration, the 
situation only gets worse for protestors’ First and Fourth Amendment 
rights. Once law enforcement perceives that it is responding to an 
emergency, it adopts a “no holds barred” approach that results in increased 
abuse of activists and their rights. Militarized policing escalates; arrest 
numbers soar; and most of the streets become no protest, no dissent zones. 
In addition, the legal emergency declaration grants the executive further 
policing power. With a preceding emergency declaration, the executive 
can activate the National Guard, beckon police from other states, institute 
a curfew, or arrest individuals based on ad hoc emergency rules. Below, I 
discuss my observation of these patterns in my target emergency 
jurisdictions. 
A. Enlistment of Multiple Police Forces 
High concentration of law enforcement on high alert creates a 
volatile environment. In the three protest jurisdictions, law enforcement 
presence was highly concentrated. Without an emergency declaration, 
police can summon law enforcement from other intrastate jurisdictions 
through existing mutual aid agreements when they want reinforcements.132 
The larger the crowds that police encounter, the more likely they will call 
for additional assistance. In North Dakota and Missouri, the local law 
enforcement called upon outside police agencies to provide additional 
force. Before any emergency was declared, the St. Louis police chief 
employed agreements to call in officers from surrounding Missouri 
jurisdictions.133 While there is no clear account of when law enforcement 
agents were called in to assist or when they left the Ferguson protests,134 
ultimately police from over 50 police departments in the state responded 
to the Ferguson protests.135 The situation was different in North Dakota. 
Governor Jack Dalrymple utilized the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (EMAC)—instead of intrastate agreement—to call in 
police from six other states.136 EMAC is an interstate agreement that 
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requires a state level emergency declaration for the deployment of out of 
state law enforcement assistance.137 Thus, the governor summoned police 
from out of state after he declared an emergency. Both EMAC and 
Ferguson’s requests for additional law enforcement are mechanisms which 
are better suited to respond to natural disasters—not protests.138 This is 
because there is no requirement that these various police agencies train 
together before providing this type of assistance.139 The merging of 
various police forces that are unfamiliar with each other and have not 
undergone emergency training together adds to the confusion and 
volatility of the situation and can aggravate the potential for constitutional 
violations. 
In Ferguson, police brought in from various jurisdictions reported 
confusion regarding the chain of command and policing tactics during the 
protests.140 This led to inconsistent arrest procedures.141 Law enforcement 
later reported that it was unclear what amounted to an arrestable offense 
and that release procedures were applied differently depending on which 
law enforcement agency effectuated the arrest.142 Police abandoned their 
regular arrest procedures. Police adherence to these procedures is vital 
because they protect individuals’ rights to be free from unreasonable 
seizures and allow protestors to express dissent without intimidation. 
Abandonment of these procedures led to arbitrary arrests; after the 
emergency declaration, officers in Ferguson were “ordered to arrest 
demonstrators and charge them indiscriminately,” regardless of whether 
these charges could be sustained.143 The message was that people “should 
                                                     
emergency declaration for the deployment of out of state law enforcement assistance. Id. Critics called 
this use of EMAC problematic since the federal law was enacted to deal with natural disasters—not 
for protest policing. Steve Horn, The Natural Disaster Assistance Law is Why Other States are 
Policing the Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, DESMOG (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.desmogblog 
.com/2016/10/27/emergency-assistance-law-dakota-access-pipeline-out-state-cops [https://perma.cc 
/QMU2-CTK7]. EMAC was enacted over twenty years ago and has only been used twice during 
protests—the pipeline protests and the Baltimore protests over the shooting of Freddie Gray. Id. 
 137. Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 6 U.S.C. § 761 (2018). 
 138. See Horn, supra note 136; see also DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 32. 
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not have been out in Ferguson protesting.”144 Police received the message 
to abandon probable cause principles and limitations and instead use 
arrests as a tool to curtail protest activity. Arrests became a method to 
temporarily incapacitate protest. These are tactics endemic to protest 
policing.145 The goal of these arrests was not to obtain a conviction, but to 
temporarily detain protestors. Activists were sometimes released from the 
jail without information about any charges and were instead told that they 
might receive paperwork later informing them of a case against them.146 
This practice suggests that in violation of the Fourth and First Amendment 
rights of these demonstrators, no probable cause existed at all to support 
these arrests. The Supreme Court has found a First Amendment violation 
when police have unfettered discretion to arrest protestors because of their 
public expressions of dissent.147 This is as true today as when individuals 
protested segregation.148 In addition, an arrest that is not supported by 
probable cause that the person has committed or will commit a criminal 
offense violates the Fourth Amendment.149 
B. Militarized Response: Police and National Guard 
As many have already observed, American policing is highly 
militarized.150 The general militarization of police has led to protest police 
tactics characterized by little regard for protestors’ speech rights, “general 
intolerance . . . for public disruption, and violent police responses to 
public contention.”151 This takes place, remarkedly so, when protestors of 
color are involved whom government actors are more likely to view as 
threatening or dangerous152 and thus is even more relevant to the Ferguson 
and pipeline protests. The police militarization on our protest sites was 
unparalleled and surpassed any critiques of warrior tactics in general 
American policing, which focus on the routine use of SWAT teams and 
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paramilitary training for drug enforcement.153 Law enforcement’s use of 
military weapons and tactics was extreme during our protests. The war-
like atmosphere on the streets of Ferguson arguably generated the 
perception that there was an emergency. 
Ferguson streets were embattled from the inception of the protests. 
Police utilized military grade tactics and tools early and before the 
governor declared a legal emergency. From the day of the shooting, police 
descended on the Ferguson neighborhood like a military unit. Tactical 
police teams rode into the neighborhood in armored vehicles.154 Although 
the Governor could not call National Guard troops until after the 
emergency declaration, local police departments nevertheless had access 
to military equipment and vehicles pursuant to various federal grants and 
programs.155 This is the same for most American police forces.156 
Demonstrators and community members reported feeling that they were 
being invaded and fighting a war against police.157 Camouflaged helmeted 
police riding on military vehicles suggest an unfolding catastrophe. These 
images—caused by the disproportionate, warrior-like police response—
created, or at least contributed to, the crisis atmosphere. 
Numerous reports and images surfaced of police officers in full battle 
gear on the ground or atop armored vehicles with the Ferguson community 
in their crosshairs.158 Police sprayed protestors with tear gas throughout 
many nights.159 These strategies were utilized for crowd control, 
intimidation, or to effectuate arrest.160 A SWAT officer was clear when he 
stated: “[We]’re going to start gassing people; start pepper balling. We are 
not gonna mess around; they’re gonna move.”161 While the officer made 
these comments before any legal emergency, it is clear that in his view 
there was already an emergency and battle on the Ferguson streets. Of 
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course, the emergency declaration did not in any way restrain abusive use 
of military equipment and practices. 
After the emergency declaration, the Missouri Governor called in 
reinforcements in the form of National Guard troops.162 Unlike police, the 
National Guard can only be called once an emergency has been 
declared.163 The Guard’s presence in response to domestic civil discontent 
is not the norm.164 The Guard is, after all, a military unit, as it is usually 
activated domestically to assist with natural disasters.165 As of 2014, 
almost half of the Guard soldiers had been called to “oversea combat duty 
in the past three years.”166 In each of our jurisdictions, the governor called 
in the National Guard.167 While there were not the types of abuse 
complaints against Guard soldiers or their tactics that there were against 
police during the initial Ferguson protests, some community members felt 
that the troops’ presence amounted to a military escalation.168 Certainly, 
the Guard’s presence did nothing to detract from the air of 
militarization.169 Even if Guard soldiers were limited to guarding the 
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police command post as the Missouri Governor declared,170 their presence 
supported abusive police conduct. The Guard soldiers were not present to 
protect protestors, but to protect police. 
A Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation of Ferguson concluded 
that military weapons, equipment, and tactics were used inappropriately 
throughout the Ferguson protests.171 Improper practices included armed 
sniper surveillance, indiscriminate use of tear gas, and employing canines 
for crowd control.172 Police “indiscriminately [shot] tear gas and other 
projectiles into a residential area.”173 These tactics violated the First and 
Fourth Amendment rights of protestors, since they amounted to excessive 
force and intimidation of activists. Police use of force must be reasonable 
in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment.174 Further, violent arrests 
curtail protestors’ First Amendment rights because they intimidate 
activists.175 When the police use of force is unreasonable, individuals feel 
unsafe engaging in protests. 
Some months after Governor Nixon terminated the initial state of 
emergency, he declared a second emergency in anticipation of the grand 
jury’s November decision of whether to indict Officer Wilson and 
immediately activated the National Guard.176 This time, having 
experienced the militarized response to the initial protests, activists 
complained that Guard presence was unnecessary and extreme.177 They 
called the activation of Guard troops, on top of 1,000 police units, an 
“overreaction.”178 Ferguson protestors placed the problematic presence of 
the Guard in the context of their deployment throughout American history 
to annihilate Black dissent.179 In denouncing Guard presence, a protest 
leader stated, “Remember we haven’t done anything. Today is the 102nd 
day of protests and there have been two days of looting out of 102 days, 
so what it shows us is that Missouri is afraid of black bodies 
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assembling.”180 The Guard’s historically violent involvement with Black 
protestors cannot be ignored,181 and its presence is naturally reminiscent 
of past injustice for African American activists. The concern that Guard 
troops would aggravate the war-like climate and response was reinforced 
after the discovery of internal communications within the Missouri Guard 
that referred to protestors as “enemy forces.”182 Documents describing the 
Guard’s mission in Ferguson labeled protestors as hate groups.183 
With 2,200 Guard troops as backup,184 police again responded with 
extreme force to the community’s disdain at the grand jury’s refusal to 
indict Officer Wilson.185 In the Templeton v. Dotson complaint, six 
plaintiffs described how they, and many others, were peacefully protesting 
this failure to indict, as well as other police shootings of unarmed black 
men and general police violence against the community.186 According to 
the complaint, unidentifiable police—without name badges and in riot 
gear—conducted mass random and violent arrests, beating and tear 
gassing activists and observers without warning.187 The Templeton 
complaint describes this police behavior over several days in late 
November 2014.188 The district court granted plaintiffs’ requests for a 
temporary restraining order preventing police from using chemical agents 
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to disperse peaceful protestors.189 The district court concluded that people 
were unable to avoid chemical agents exposure because officers were 
using the agents “to disperse crowds of protestors . . . who were not 
engaged in violent or criminal activity”—without warning and in violation 
of the First Amendment.190 
This type of police activity is unconstitutional because it precludes 
protests and also chills individuals’ speech and assembly rights.191 The 
district judge in Templeton properly enjoined the government’s use of tear 
gas to stop the demonstrations. Peaceful protestors are protected by the 
First Amendment.192 This is so even when observers or others present 
become “unruly.”193 The violent actions of a few cannot restrict the First 
Amendment rights of others. Government policies are clear: tear gas 
should only be used after proper warnings so that individuals can 
disperse.194 As a matter of fact, the U.S. military cannot use tear gas in 
international warfare against its enemies.195 This is because tear gas can 
be dangerous and cannot be controlled once fired.196 Incomprehensibly, 
the government can use tear gas on its own people.197 Therefore if used, 
chemical agents should only be employed as a tool of “last resort” during 
protests and only after protestors have received a warning and had an 
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opportunity to leave the area. In contravention of this principle, tear gas 
seemed to be first responders’ preferred tool in Ferguson.198 
Furthermore, according to the Missouri statute, an officer can only 
arrest for refusal to disperse if “[a] person . . . present at the scene of an 
unlawful assembly . . . or of a riot . . . knowingly fails or refuses to obey 
the lawful command of a law enforcement officer to depart from the 
scene.”199 Thus, if there was no command, there was no crime of refusal 
to disperse. Even if Ferguson protestors had been able to avoid chemical 
exposure, police would still be violating the rights of individuals who had 
to flee because the officers were precluding their ability to protest on 
public streets. Directing police officers to break up peaceful protests 
through force, including tear gas and other chemical irritants or agents, 
violates clearly established First Amendment principles.200 The intent of 
state officials could not have been clearer, considering admissions by 
police officers that their marching orders were to stop the protests.201 
Courts must closely scrutinize restrictions on speech and assembly on 
streets because they are traditional public forums.202 “[S]treets and 
parks . . . ‘have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public 
and, time out of mind, have been used for the purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.’”203 
Furthermore, the government need not completely preclude speech 
to violate the First Amendment. Instead, inhibition of speech in traditional 
public forums is unwarranted and unconstitutional without a compelling 
state interest and a narrowly tailored restriction.204 The indiscriminate use 
of chemical agents not only prevents peaceful protests, but also dissuades 
others from engaging in demonstrations out of fear. Government 
intimidation tactics will lead many to “simply abstain from protected 
speech, harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is 
deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”205 The question of 
whether there is an unconstitutional chilling effect on the First 
Amendment depends on gauging the balance between the level of 
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government deterrence and the purported state interest.206 While the 
purported government interest is public order on the streets of Ferguson, a 
state strategy that precludes all dissent by force—not just violent dissent—
fails as overbroad,207 because it suppresses peaceable public expression. 
In the pipeline protests, the government response shifted from 
regular policing to a militarized response after the Governor’s emergency 
declaration. Early in those protests, police did not resort to military grade 
weapons or tactics. Water protectors set up camp in objection to any 
pipeline construction starting in April 2016. While some arrests began 
months later in August, there were no reports of a militarized police 
presence.208 Photos of that time period show police in regular uniform 
instead of military garb.209 The governor declared a legal emergency on 
August 19, 2016,210 and government aggression escalated. 
About three weeks after the emergency declaration, the Governor 
activated 100 National Guard troops to the pipeline area, with two dozen 
troops to conduct traffic checks while armed.211 Within three months, this 
number increased to 500 Guard soldiers.212 Complaints of government 
intimidation referenced actions of the police and Guard soldiers.213 Sioux 
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Tribe Chairman David Archambault expressed that checkpoints guarded 
by military vehicles and heavily armed soldiers intimidated water 
protectors.214 The emergency declaration provided the Governor not only 
with the ability to mobilize Guard troops, but also to make use of their 
“federally assigned . . . vehicles . . . and other equipment.”215 The 
Chairman also cited intimidation by increasingly militarized police 
forces.216 Police shifted their tactics to include the use of chemical agents 
at the pipeline site. Law enforcement utilized a range of military 
weapons—including pepper spray, tear gas, long range acoustic devices, 
water hoses and cannons, and rubber bullets. Human rights groups echoed 
the Chairman’s concerns asserting that law enforcement used militarized 
tactics to intimidate peaceful demonstrators.217 
Plaintiffs in the Dundon v. Kirchmeier complaint recounted how law 
enforcement confronted them and other water protectors during a late 
November spiritual ceremony and sprayed them in subfreezing 
temperatures with water cannons mounted atop an armored vehicle.218 
People were sprayed for ten minutes at a time for a whole hour.219 Police 
hit activists (even on their faces) with tear gas grenades.220 One woman 
suffered permanent injury to her eye when she was hit with a tear gas 
canister.221 Ultimately, twenty-six people required hospitalization.222 
Plaintiffs claimed that these police actions amounted to a violation of 
protestors’ First and Fourth Amendment rights because this violence 
intimidated protestors and therefore chilled their expression, and this use 
of weapons amounted to excessive force.223 The Dundon matter is 
currently pending before the district court. However, the case has a 
checkered past. In 2017, the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion for 
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an injunction preventing law enforcement from using less-than-lethal 
weapons, water hoses, and water canons to disperse protestors, finding that 
plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.224 The 
judge’s finding regarding the First Amendment claim was that water 
protectors were located on a bridge closed to public and thus, had no right 
to protest there.225 On the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, the 
judge essentially declared that the water protectors were never arrested or 
detained, and thus were free to leave the area when confronted by police 
with water hoses.226 In addition, the judge labeled the situation as chaotic, 
and ruled that he could not conclude at the injunction stage that it was 
unreasonable for police to utilize these weapons against water 
protectors.227 
The district judge was too quick to deny the injunction. The Fourth 
Amendment does not permit police to use excessive force during any 
seizure.228 According to the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, force is 
excessive and unconstitutional when it is not objectively reasonable in 
light of existing circumstances.229 Although it is easiest to demonstrate that 
someone is seized when police arrest them, the Fourth Amendment applies 
to law enforcement seizures that are less than arrests. A seizure occurs 
whenever an individual reasonably believes that she is not free to leave.230 
Contrary to the district judge’s assertion that “protestors could have easily 
removed themselves from the . . . [b]ridge and the presence of law 
enforcement,”231 the Dundon plaintiffs explained that they were unable to 
escape the “unrelenting bombardment of [Specialty Impact Munitions], 
chemical agents, and high-pressure water.”232 In their amended complaint, 
plaintiffs further explained both that “[c]louds of chemical agents” 
prevented egress, and that other did not want to leave other injured water 
protectors to fend for themselves.233 Plaintiffs were effectively seized on 
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the bridge once police began the barrage of water and chemical agents. 
The concept of seizure is complicated in protest cases where police use 
force to disperse protestors with courts reaching different conclusions 
about whether an activist was seized depending on the jurisdiction.234 
However, even in jurisdictions that define a seizure narrowly when police 
seek to disperse individuals, the court will still conclude that police have 
seized a person who is incapacitated by chemical agents and submits to 
police authority.235 In Dundon, the judge ignored plaintiffs’ statements that 
they were incapacitated and trapped by police use of less than lethal 
weapons. 
Graham’s reasonableness analysis requires the balancing of the force 
applied by the government with the need for that force.236 The factors that 
the court must consider in this analysis are “the severity of the crime at 
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting 
to evade arrest by flight.”237 
Taking into account these factors, there simply was no need for the 
level of force used by police against the water protectors in Dundon. While 
the judge articulated the Graham factors, he did not apply them to the facts 
in the case.238 A methodological application of the factors would have 
concluded that no violent crime was afoot—most water protectors were, 
at worst, trespassers if the bridge was actually closed to the public. There 
was no immediate safety threat because most demonstrators were 
peaceful—as recognized by the judge.239 Finally, water protectors were 
not a flight risk. However, the judge completely deferred to police actions, 
using law enforcement’s own decision to call in additional units as proof 
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that the level of force was warranted.240 This is despite the judge’s 
recognition that police used water hoses and chemical agents 
indiscriminately.241 
It cannot be reasonable for police to spray demonstrators with water 
hoses or cannons to the point of hypothermia and shoot tear gas grenades 
at mostly peaceful protestors because it is a direct impediment to their 
constitutionally protected rights to peaceful protest. The fact that those on 
the bridge were engaged in First Amendment activity means that the 
government actions must be more scrupulously reviewed.242 The district 
judge ignored this prescription and thus facilitated police abuse of activists 
and the quelling of dissent. 
Regarding their First Amendment claims, Dundon plaintiffs 
contended all along that the bridge was open to the public during the 
event.243 If this is the case, the police actions in Dundon violated water 
protectors’ First Amendment rights, just like the actions of Ferguson law 
enforcement in Templeton. The bridge is like a street, park, or sidewalk, 
which are considered traditional public forums.244 The district judge 
asserted that water protectors would have needed to obtain permits to 
protest even if the bridge was not closed to the public or even if they were 
protesting on the streets.245 Government authorities may require protestors 
to obtain a permit.246 However, even with a permitting requirement, the 
district judge would still have to evaluate the process to determine that it 
did not discriminate based on the content of the speech and was instead a 
neutral time, place or manner restriction.247 The district judge did not 
engage in any of this analysis. 
As previously mentioned, the Seattle mayor declared an emergency 
on the first afternoon of the WTO Conference. Like police in my other 
narratives, Seattle law enforcement also used military weapons 
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inadequately and dangerously on WTO protestors. Police outfitted in 
militaristic garb used tear gas, pepper spray, or rubber bullets to clear 
protestors.248 At one site, police sprayed individuals sitting down in protest 
after forcibly removing their masks.249 There were accounts of teams of 
police jumping out of vehicles to gas and shoot rubber bullets at 
unsuspecting activists.250 Careless use of these weapons even endangered 
individuals uninvolved with the protests.251 At the mayor’s request, state 
troopers participated in the policing of the WTO protests.252 The State 
Patrol Chief later criticized the use of chemical agents by Seattle police 
calling them “pointless ‘gas and run’ tactics.”253 These accounts of abusive 
use of chemical weapons by police were not few and far between, but 
rampant.254 
C. Mass Arrests 
In the protest jurisdictions, police used arrests to incapacitate 
protestors. When police use arrests in this manner, their objective is not to 
obtain a conviction, but rather to temporarily detain individuals and stop 
protesting activity. Thus, the police do not assess whether there is probable 
cause of criminal conduct as the Fourth Amendment requires, and instead 
they arrest to suppress dissent in contravention of First Amendment rights. 
While law enforcement agents regularly use this arrest tactic when dealing 
with protestors,255 the executive’s declaration of an emergency augments 
the problem. Once there is an emergency declaration, law enforcement 
agents act with flagrant disregard for the constitutional limitations of 
arrest. This is evident from the practice of mass arrests and the elevated 
volume of arrests after the emergency declaration in my three protest 
narratives. 
In the Seattle WTO Conference scenario, police arrested protestors 
en masse. A large swath of protestors were arrested in a park—within a 
no-protest zone ordered by the Seattle mayor. In the case of Menotti v. City 
of Seattle, one hundred and seventy-five marchers were surrounded by 
police within the no-protest area and when they responded by sitting, they 
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were arrested without any warning and without police having assessed 
whether any of the marchers were permitted to be in the zone.256 At an 
eventual trial, jurors concluded that the police had violated these arrestees’ 
Fourth Amendment rights after hearing evidence that the arrestees’ police 
reports were fabricated.257 When police reports of these arrests were 
compared, they were all found to be identical and false. Instead of writing 
an individualized report for each arrest, police simply duplicated one 
report from an unassociated arrest that had occurred hours before at a 
different location.258 
The Menotti case demonstrates the problem endemic with mass 
arrests, which shows that these types of arrests are by definition arbitrary 
and therefore unreasonable. Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest is 
justified when the court can make a finding that a reasonable person in the 
officer’s position—faced with the specific facts and circumstances—
would have probable cause to believe that the arrestee had committed or 
was in the process of committing a criminal offense,259 or—in a legal 
emergency—refusing to comply with an emergency order. Probable cause 
is a particularized assessment with respect to each arrested individual.260 
A police officer cannot reasonably make a particularized probable cause 
assessment for a mass of people. Prior to the trial, the district judge 
presiding over the case granted summary judgment to some of the 
plaintiffs on the probable cause question elucidating this point.261 The 
judge stated that just like in other circumstances, during protests 
“individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required for probable 
cause.”262 The police cannot paint all activists with a broad brush because 
they are all engaged in protest activity. The police officers in the Westlake 
Park mass arrest could not make the necessary observations regarding each 
protestor to determine whether each was engaging in illegal conduct or 
behaving in violation of the emergency order. Yet, the pressure to arrest 
and to control and suppress the protests created by the emergency 
declaration instigated officers to falsify police reports. After all was said 
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and done, there were 631 people arrested in four days in Seattle, and in the 
overwhelming majority of these arrests individuals were either never 
charged or their cases were dismissed.263 Once protestors arrived at the 
jail, they were mistreated by jail officials, particularly if they sought to 
exercise their right to legal counsel.264 Protestors reported about 300 
incidents of excessive force by correctional officers.265 This number of 
complaints is unconscionable and demonstrates that these individuals were 
targeted during detention for their protest activity. 
Likewise, after the gubernatorial emergency in North Dakota, law 
enforcement replicated the pattern of mass arrests and abusive post-arrest 
treatment—targeting water protectors en masse and then punishing them 
with humiliating detention tactics. In two incidents in October, 
approximately 250 people were arrested. In the first incident, police 
arrested about 130 people as they marched and prayed.266 Five days later, 
police used less than lethal military weapons on water protectors and 
arrested about 140 people, most of whom had simply been praying.267 
Narratives described police advancing with tanks and in riot gear after 
attempting to remove people from their encampment.268 Those arrested 
reported abusive conditions, including being unnecessarily strip searched 
and women being left naked in cells.269 No rationale justifies law 
enforcement holding people naked in their cells. This amounts to punitive 
pretrial detention conditions that violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. The Due Process Clause forbids punishing an arrestee 
who has not yet been convicted of any offense.270 In assessing whether a 
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condition of pretrial detention amounts to a punishment, a court inquires 
whether there is an “expressed intent to punish.”271 If there is not, the court 
will assess whether the condition is reasonably related to a legitimate 
government purpose or whether it “appears excessive . . . arbitrary or 
purposeless.”272 Detaining people naked in cells can only fit the latter. The 
government could not possibly articulate a “legitimate government 
purpose” for humiliating women in this manner. No public or individual 
safety rationale justifies this mode of detention. Even when there is 
concern for a detainee’s safety such as when someone is considered 
suicidal the individual is garbed in special anti-suicide smocks.273 Of 
course, there was no allegation that these women were suicidal. Further, 
use of this humiliating tactic demonstrates an actual intent to punish. 
The Supreme Court has dealt with strip searches from the perspective 
of the Fourth Amendment, in addition to due process. The Court has ruled 
that a strip search of pretrial detainees does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment when conducted to protect against disease, contraband, or 
weapons.274 Generally, judicial review is deferential to jail officials 
“unless there is ‘substantial evidence’ demonstrating that their response to 
the situation is exaggerated.”275 The factual contexts of these strip searches 
are unclear. Without more information regarding how, where, and by 
whom they were conducted, it is difficult to assess whether arrestees could 
demonstrate that these searches were exaggerated under the 
circumstances. However, the fact that people were simultaneously held 
naked in their cells evidences an intent to punish in violation of due 
process and demonstrates that the searches were, therefore, unreasonable 
and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. These arrest conditions are 
untenable and violate not only detainees’ constitutional rights, but also 
human decency. Needless to say, being subjected not only to these 
unreasonable and militarized mass arrests but also to humiliating searches 
and detention conditions will dissuade most from expressing public 
dissent. 
The same arbitrary arrest mentality dictated the police strategy in 
Ferguson after the gubernatorial emergency declaration. In interactions 
with protestors, police made telling assertions, such as stating that “the 
constitution did not provide any constitutional right to assemble” and that 
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they were advised to “arrest demonstrators and charge them 
indiscriminately, even though they were certain that the charges would not 
stand.”276 The police felt that people should not be protesting.277 An 
analysis of arrest numbers demonstrates a marked increase in the 
frequency of arrests after the emergency declaration. The DOJ 
investigation estimates that police arrested about 300 people in connection 
with the initial Ferguson protests.278 
My examination of St. Louis County police arrest records from 
August 10th to 21st demonstrate that almost all of these arrests occurred 
after the governor’s emergency declaration.279 When looking at arrest 
numbers, I counted arrests made in the protest area for certain crimes, 
namely refusal to disperse, disorderly conduct, interference with police, 
weapon possession, and destruction of property. I limited my investigation 
to these types of arrests because I believe that they are most likely to be 
connected to the protests. Almost 85% of arrests were for refusal to 
disperse. Understanding that these records may not encompass all arrests, 
such as when an individual was released before booking or when an 
arrestee was booked in another county, the numbers show that police only 
made nine relevant arrests in the six days before the emergency 
declaration, while they made 142 arrests in the five days after the 
declaration.280 Since the emergency continued after August 21st for ten 
more days, we can assume that the approximately 150 remaining arrests 
occurred during the rest of the emergency period. Thus, there is a 
staggering difference in the volume of arrests before versus after the 
emergency declaration. This difference—along with police’s admitted 
statements—shows that the state of emergency in Missouri animated law 
enforcement to engage in arbitrary and voluminous arrests. 
D. Restricting Use of Traditional Public Forums 
Another pattern discernable from the protest jurisdictions is 
controlling of protestors’ expressive activities in public physical spaces. 
As previously mentioned, people enjoy the greatest level of First 
Amendment freedoms in public streets and parks—otherwise called 
traditional public forums.281 In the protest jurisdictions, the executive 
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limited activists’ access to the streets via protest zones and curfews. While 
police do not need an emergency declaration to restrict protesting to 
certain areas, law enforcement instituted these protest/free-speech zones 
in Ferguson and Seattle after the governor and mayor proclaimed an 
emergency.282 The executive can only institute a curfew with a preceding 
emergency declaration. 
1. Assembly & No-Protest/Speech Zones 
When the government restricts protests to a specific area, these areas 
are “free-speech zones.” Outside the parameters of the zone, speech and 
assembly is foreclosed. These restrictions of demonstrators are justified 
during an emergency as tools to keep the peace. From the activist 
perspective, these types of free-speech zones minimize the effectiveness 
of protests, reducing the volume, expanse, and reach of the message.283 
Official statements that emergency directives—which include protest 
zones—are meant to protect speakers are not uncommon,284 but the larger 
public space then becomes a no-speech, no-dissent zone. The Supreme 
Court has not yet ruled on whether the use of protest zones or pens 
conforms with the First Amendment. Lower courts have categorized and 
evaluated these zones as content-neutral time, place, and manner 
restrictions, and thus have applied the test the Supreme Court elucidated 
in the Ward v. Rock Against Racism case.285 In Ward, plaintiffs challenged 
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a New York City ordinance that required bands performing in Central Park 
to use City sound equipment and a City sound technician to regulate the 
degree of noise.286 Finding that the ordinance was a content neutral time, 
place, and manner restriction on the First Amendment rights of musicians, 
the Court reasoned that the City alleged a substantial interest in noise 
regulation, and that the ordinance survived because it was narrowly 
tailored and provided alternative channels for expression.287 First 
Amendment experts have criticized the application of the Ward test to 
protest zones, suggesting that courts realistically are applying “a weak 
strain of rationality review” that is not sufficiently protective and chills 
speech.288 Courts are particularly deferential when the government alleges 
a security concern.289 Courts can most easily take this view when the 
government claims that there is an emergency situation.290 This results in 
an increasingly protracted review where the Court will easily justify the 
spatial restriction on First Amendment rights. The Ward test is not 
appropriate for speech zones—particularly when the protest is the 
emergency that the government is protecting against. The Supreme Court 
stated in Ward that “[t]he principal inquiry in determining content 
neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of 
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”291 In the 
protest jurisdictions, the restrictions are not comparable to a noise 
ordinance. The protest conduct is not distinguishable from the message. 
Furthermore, in all the protest jurisdictions, the message is critical of the 
government—thus unlike messages targeted by neutral noise ordinances. 
More exacting review is warranted than a weak brand of content-neutral 
analysis. 
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In both Ferguson and Seattle, there is no question that the 
government regulated the use of public city streets.292 Police enforced 
these regulations with less than lethal weapons, aggression, and arrests—
as discussed in the preceding section. In Seattle, the mayor instituted a 
protest zone through an emergency order.293 While the Seattle mayor’s 
statement termed the restriction a “curfew,” the restriction essentially 
amounted to a zoning which prohibited civilians—with exceptions for 
WTO delegates and area residents and business owners—from entering 
downtown Seattle during the conference.294 Litigants in Menotti v. City of 
Seattle filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all those arrested due to the 
no-protest zone and thereafter not convicted.295 As expected, the Ninth 
Circuit applied the content-neutral Ward analysis. In response to the facial 
First Amendment challenge, the court found that the restriction was 
content neutral because it did not limit a particular type or content of 
speech—but instead limited the place where speech was permitted.296 Of 
course, those protesting in the zone would necessarily be protesting the 
WTO. 
On whether the restriction was narrowly tailored, the court ultimately 
answered by refusing to “inject [itself] into the methods of policing.”297 
This was despite the WTO no-protest zone covering a twenty-five block 
radius of Seattle streets.298 The Menotti opinion evidences the court’s 
fear—as it focused the discussion on violent protestors, despite 
recognizing that the overwhelming majority were lawful and peaceful.299 
The court then concluded that there were ample alternative areas to protest, 
despite the large no-protest zone300—again citing violence and “dire 
facts.”301 Thus, the court found that the curfew was a facially valid time, 
place, and manner restriction.302 Menotti did find that a First Amendment 
as applied challenge was appropriate and should proceed to trial, as well 
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as a Fourth Amendment challenge for unreasonable arrests and seizures.303 
Ultimately, at trial a jury found that police violated activists’ Fourth 
Amendment rights, but not their First Amendment rights to free speech.304 
Even without the jury finding a First Amendment violation, the jury’s 
verdict on the Fourth Amendment issue signals constitutional concerns 
associated with the use of no-protest zones. After the verdict, Seattle 
eventually settled by paying $1 million to 175 arrested protestors and 
clearing their criminal records.305 
As seen by the Menotti opinion, facial challenges to protest zones 
easily survive court scrutiny because they are evaluated as content-neutral 
restrictions. As applied First Amendment violations are difficult to prove 
because plaintiffs must demonstrate to a jury that chilling protected speech 
“was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct.”306 This 
element is challenging for plaintiffs because it requires the jury to assess 
not only a police officer’s subjective intent, but specifically whether 
chilling the plaintiff’s expression was the motivating and/or substantial 
objective. Reading the police officers’ personal motives might feel 
impossible for jurors. Fourth Amendment violations present a less 
insurmountable challenge, since jurors are asked to assess whether the 
seizure was reasonable under the circumstances307—not whether the police 
officer’s subjective intent was reasonable. 
Three days after the Missouri emergency declaration, the highway 
patrol—which the governor placed in command via executive order—
restricted protests to a specific zone.308 Protestors were displaced from the 
locations that they had selected to gather and communicate with the 
media.309 Protestors complained that this alternative site was not relevant 
to their protest and not accessible to the media zone.310 The protest zone 
in Ferguson was not challenged, despite activists’ concerns—perhaps due 
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to the ease of overcoming judicial review. In North Dakota, the U.S. Corps 
of Engineers eventually established a “free-speech zone” far from pipeline 
construction.311 Within the week, the North Dakota Governor ordered the 
evacuation of the relevant area.312 
2. Curfews 
Governors and mayors often set curfews pursuant to an emergency 
declaration.313 An emergency declaration is a necessary antecedent to a 
curfew.314 Missouri Revised Statute section 44.100 and North Dakota 
Central Code section 37.17.1-05, both listing the governor’s emergency 
power, do not explicitly mention curfews.315 However, the North Dakota 
law states that the governor can “control ingress and egress in 
a[n] . . . emergency area, the movement of persons within the area . . . .”316 
Less specifically, the Missouri law states that the governor can direct law 
enforcement to “secur[e] compliance” with emergency orders.317 Further, 
both these statutes have broad, catch-all provisions.318 Seattle Municipal 
Code section 10.02.020 explicitly states that in an emergency, the mayor 
can order a curfew.319 
Without an emergency declaration, the executive cannot impose a 
curfew that does not at least provide an exception for First Amendment 
activity. The existence of an emergency declaration determines whether a 
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court will—without a First Amendment exception—find the curfew to be 
an unconstitutional restriction on individuals’ rights. Courts have upheld 
curfews that are enacted during a legal emergency.320 General curfews 
impact the rights of speech and assembly. They generally preclude all 
types of public activity during a portion of the day—including protest. 
Courts apply a particularly yielding reasonableness test when evaluating 
an “emergency” curfew. For emergency curfews, judges inquire only 
whether the curfew was enacted in good faith and whether a factual basis 
exists for the decision that such action was necessary to maintain order.321 
As I will discuss in the next Part of this Article, this is the same yielding 
standard that courts apply when assessing the propriety of the emergency 
declaration.322 In the emergency curfew cases, the courts compare the 
government’s asserted interest in public safety with the freedom interests 
of individuals.323 The government always wins when it alleges a threat to 
life and property that warrants an emergency declaration.324 Particularly 
with nighttime curfews, courts dismiss concerns by highlighting dangers 
associated with the evening hours of an emergency and by reasoning that 
individuals retain access to the streets for protest or other activities during 
day time.325 But courts also do not scrutinize an executive’s emergency 
declaration.326 This, coupled with minimal judicial review of both the state 
of emergency and the resulting curfew, means the legal emergency 
abridges First Amendment rights via a curfew that would not be permitted 
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without the executive declaration. The court’s calculus of balancing the 
government’s asserted safety interest with individual rights is not 
sufficiently protective of the First Amendment when the protest is the 
emergency. This is because, while the curfew forbids every person from 
being on the streets, the executive institutes it in response to mass 
protests—not a natural or other disaster. Thus, it is difficult to argue that 
it is not targeted to stop the protests. However, because of the emergency 
lens, courts apply a lenient reasonableness and good faith standard to the 
curfew. 
Without an emergency declaration, courts seriously consider the 
First Amendment implications of curfews.327 Curfews are considered time, 
place, and manner restrictions; and courts will invalidate them when there 
is no “clear and present danger”328 or a First Amendment exception. This 
is because a curfew is an “all-encompassing restriction . . . . [It] 
significantly restricts expression in all forums for [a significant portion] of 
[the] day.”329 From this perspective, the courts’ content-neutral time, 
place, and manner review has more bite than in the previously discussed 
no-protest zones. Using this analysis, courts have found that juvenile 
curfews without robust First Amendment exceptions are not narrowly 
tailored; therefore, they are unconstitutional.330 Emergency curfews 
cannot have First Amendment exceptions, particularly when the protest is 
the emergency. It is the emergency declarations that condone and justify 
this “all-encompassing restriction” on speech. 
In Ferguson, the governor instituted a curfew from midnight to five 
in the morning in his initial executive order declaring the emergency.331 
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Contrary to the promise that the curfew would not be “enforce[d] with 
trucks . . . [or] with tear gas, [but with] communication,”332 law 
enforcement traveling in armored vehicles used tear gas on 
demonstrators.333 On the first night of the curfew, police shot one African 
American teenager and arrested others.334 In their Statement on the 
Ferguson Curfew, civil rights groups asserted infringements on protestors’ 
First Amendment rights and declared that the curfew essentially amounted 
to “a lockdown on the residents of Ferguson.”335 From its inception, civil 
rights groups complained that the Ferguson curfew suppressed speech.336 
Despite these complaints, the curfew was not challenged in court. This 
may be due to courts’ deferential review. 
E. Ad Hoc Emergency Rules and Practices 
In my protest narratives, government officials enforced a series of ad 
hoc rules, prompted by the proclaimed emergency, that created fear and 
suppressed First Amendment activity. 
In Ferguson, police commanders under the supervision of the 
Missouri State Highway Patrol—the police agency designated by the 
Governor as incident commander337—instituted a “keep moving” 
strategy.338 During a legal emergency, any orders by the governor or his 
designated incident commander become the law of the land.339 
Noncompliance with those rules was an arrestable offense.340 This rule 
required protestors to keep moving when outside the protest zone or be 
arrested for failure to disperse,341 despite the fact that this conduct did not 
warrant an arrest for that crime.342 The state’s failure to disperse crime 
instead required that an individual fail to obey a lawful command while 
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being present at a riot or an unlawful assembly.343 Police were not told to 
assess whether protestors were somehow engaged in either rioting or 
unlawful assembly. Police were informed of the keep moving strategy 
during roll call, but they were provided no guidance regarding how and 
under what circumstances it should apply.344 Officers were just instructed 
“to use their discretion.”345 The police applied the policy in myriad ways, 
including ordering people not to stand still for more than five seconds, to 
continue to move at a particular speed, etc.346 Some officers only applied 
the keep moving policy to those outside the protest zone, while others 
applied it within, and there were also inconsistencies about whether the 
rule applied to the press.347 Activists believed that the purpose of the keep 
moving rule was to exhaust protestors.348 
The same day that the keep moving rule was enacted and enforced 
by police, plaintiff filed a civil complaint in Abdullah v. County of St. 
Louis and sought to enjoin the practice.349 The complaint asserted that the 
ad hoc rule violated the First Amendment and due process.350 At the initial 
hearing, the judge applied the time, place, and manner test and denied 
plaintiff’s first request for a temporary restraining order that the practice 
cease immediately.351 The court was convinced by the government’s 
contention that, while the keep moving practice was in effect, there was 
an alternative designated protest zone.352 The plaintiff then returned to the 
streets of Ferguson. Despite his inability to locate the zone that day, he 
was again forced to keep moving.353 Law enforcement utilized this keep 
moving strategy, albeit inconsistently, for five days.354 Using the Ward test 
for content-neutral restrictions, the court eventually decided that the 
plaintiff would likely succeed in a First Amendment challenge to the 
strategy that did not permit him to either engage in conversation with 
others on the sidewalk or peacefully assemble.355 The court ruled that the 
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keep moving strategy was not narrowly tailored, but instead was a blanket 
rule applied too broadly to protect the government’s asserted interest to 
prevent violence.356 The court further concluded that even if the keep 
moving restriction could be justified there was likely no adequate alternate 
forum since the establishment of a protest zone was delayed.357 
The court also agreed with the plaintiff that the keep moving strategy 
likely violated due process and the Fourth Amendment.358 Due process 
principles require that when a government rule affects First Amendment 
rights, the rule must provide a “greater degree of specificity” or be void 
for vagueness.359 This is because a rule is unconstitutionally vague when 
it does not give notice of what conduct is prohibited so individuals may 
regulate their behavior; further, this vagueness also promotes arbitrary 
application by law enforcement.360 The court found that the tactic both 
gave insufficient notice to civilians regarding what conduct was prohibited 
and provided the police with too much discretion.361 The court agreed with 
the plaintiff’s allegation that this broad police discretion “authorize[d] and 
encourage[d] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”362 A community 
member confirmed this, stating: “The five-second rule only applied to 
those people that police wanted it to apply to.”363 Consistent with my 
arguments in the prior section, I believe the Ward time, place, and manner 
test is not sufficiently protective of First Amendment rights when the 
protest is the chaos that law enforcement is attempting to quash. This is 
even more so in Ferguson, where the message was intimately connected 
to the expression and was critical of the same police who instituted and 
enforced the keep moving tactic.364 Furthermore, although this was not an 
argument made by the plaintiff in the suit, failure to disperse arrests 
resulting from enforcement of the unlawful keep moving strategy were not 
supported by probable cause, since the police did not engage in any 
determination regarding the main element of the crime—the existence of 
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a riot or an unlawful assembly. Thus, the strategy also violated the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Police officers adopted the ad hoc practice of not wearing or covering 
name tags and badges in both Seattle and Ferguson.365 This practice was 
contrary to the policies of their police departments.366 Across law 
enforcement, police officers must be readily identifiable.367 This is 
because an anonymous militarized police force is dangerous. Anonymity 
is inconsistent with accountability and breeds violence.368 Civilians can 
hold officers personally accountable for their unlawful or violent actions 
via complaint procedures or lawsuits. Nameless police officers can instead 
act with personal “impunity.”369 During the WTO protests, police wore 
riot gear that did not identify officers and covered their badges,370 turning 
them into nameless warriors. Police also covered their badges with rain 
gear or even removed or altered their badges.371 Some police went as far 
as wearing ski masks.372 In Ferguson, police also removed any identifying 
information.373 The Deputy Chief of the DOJ Civil Rights Division wrote 
a letter to the Ferguson Police Chief demanding that law enforcement stop 
this practice and stating that the Department received “numerous 
complaints” about such conduct demonstrating that it was “not 
aberrational.”374 When civilians asked anonymous officers for their names 
in Ferguson or Seattle, they refused to identify themselves.375 Besides 
providing police with a sense of immunity for misconduct, a militarized, 
aggressive, and anonymous high police presence is understandably 
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intimidating for protestors. Such intimidation chills activists’ willingness 
to confront this police force and engage in protest. 
Ad hoc practices by judges and government lawyers in Seattle also 
were conducive to the suppression of protestors’ rights. After police swept 
up individuals in massive and arbitrary arrests on the streets of Seattle, 
protestors could not escape jail unless they agreed to stay away from the 
WTO area—thus impeding further their right to protest. Prosecutors 
conditioned protestors’ release on their agreement to stay out of downtown 
Seattle.376 Those who did not agree to the downtown restriction were not 
released.377 In one particularly egregious case, a woman was only released 
after she agreed to refrain from protesting anywhere in the U.S. for two 
years.378 These preconditions to release amount to violations of traditional 
bail principles. “[T]he ‘general rule’ of substantive due process [is] that 
the government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a 
criminal trial.”379 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Eighth Amendment guarantee against excessive bail to mean that the main 
objective in imposing pretrial detention is assuring the accused’s return to 
court to face the criminal matter.380 When the judge at arraignment is 
making this determination, the judge must consider factors that are 
relevant to flight.381 These factors are codified in the federal bail statute 
and include: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including 
whether the offense is a crime of violence . . . ; (2) the weight of the 
evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the 
person . . . ; and (4) the nature and the seriousness of the danger to 
any person or the community that would be posed by . . . release.382 
The Court has also held that it does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment and Due Process to detain someone pretrial when the accused 
is charged with a dangerous crime, and the judge finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that no combination of release conditions could 
assure community safety.383 State criminal bail statutes and rules 
essentially capture the same principles as their federal counterparts.384 As 
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a matter of fact, the Washington State Constitution guarantees no 
excessive bail and that “[a]ll persons charged with crimes shall be bailable 
by sufficient sureties,” unless charged with a capital offense.385 None of 
these well-established bail principles justify protestors being held in jail 
simply for refusing to agree to stay away from the WTO area. There is no 
connection between that condition and posing a flight risk or danger to the 
community. It is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment and Due 
Process principles for the government to impose this restriction as a 
precondition to release, and it demonstrates how prosecutors and judges 
were complicit in the suppression of protests in Seattle. Although not one 
of my target narratives, after the Maryland Governor declared an 
emergency in Baltimore in response to mass protests and outcry because 
of the death of Freddie Gray—an African American man—while in police 
custody, prosecutors used an analogous tactic: keeping arrested protestors 
detained for over forty-eight hours without access to a hearing.386 This 
practice was in direct contravention of Maryland Rule 4-212(e) requiring 
arrested individuals to be brought for bail determination before a judicial 
officer within twenty-four hours of arrest.387 
F. Conclusion 
As demonstrated by the WTO, Ferguson, and pipeline protests in 
North Dakota, the threat to constitutional liberties is serious when state 
and local governments utilize emergency management mechanisms and 
tools to respond to perceived crises. The threat increases when the 
executive proclaims a legal emergency because it incites law enforcement 
to amplify their use of existing policing tactics and expands the arsenal of 
oppressive tools that the government can use to suppress protests. 
Executive interests are not aligned with the protection of individual 
liberties but with maintaining public order and guarding public safety. 
Therefore, state and local authorities taxed with emergency management 
duties are currently not well equipped to safeguard the rights of protestors, 
members of the community, and the press. Further, current legislative and 
judicial mechanisms provide no adequate check on government’s 
emergency actions when the protest is the crisis. 
                                                     
trial.” Id. When considering whether the government has overcome the presumption of release on 
personal recognizance, the judge will balance factors similar to those in the federal bail statute. See id. 
 385. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 14, 20. 
 386. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus & Application for Temporary Restraining Order & 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Carrie v. Scruggs, No. 24H15000166 (Cir. Ct. for Balt. City 
Apr. 29, 2015); see also Md. Exec. Order 01.01.2015.14 (Apr. 27, 2015). 
 387. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus & Application for Temporary Restraining Order & 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Carrie, No. 24H15000166; see also MD. R. CRIM. § 4-212(e). 
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IV. CHECKS ON THE EXECUTIVE’S EMERGENCY POWER IN RESPONSE TO 
PROTEST 
A. Legislative Check is Not Enough 
Some may look towards legislatures to manage executive emergency 
action. State legislatures often possess some authority regarding 
emergency declarations. Missouri is unlike most states in that the 
legislature can initiate an emergency.388 This is unusual.389 Legislatures 
may have more authority over how the emergency ends. In about half of 
the states, either the governor or the legislature can end the emergency.390 
Whether a state legislature will realistically act to terminate a 
gubernatorial emergency is a separate issue. In addition, legislative 
consent or approval may also be required to extend the gubernatorially-
declared emergency beyond some initially circumscribed amount of 
time.391 At the municipal level, city councils or commissions can play a 
role in a local emergency declaration.392 
Even when legislatures can theoretically limit the power of the 
governor to declare a state of emergency, they do not realistically serve as 
a check on the governor’s actions. The state legislature may abdicate the 
decision to terminate a state of emergency.393 This may be due to 
legislators’ sensitivity to the governor’s position as commander in chief, 
lawmakers’ fears of taking ownership and responsibility for an emergency 
declaration and its consequences, or legislators’ inability to reach a 
consensus quickly enough to respond to existing exigencies. Legislators 
may also feel that they are at an information deficit compared to the 
                                                     
 388. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100.1(1) (2008). 
 389. A review of state emergency laws reveals that in addition to Missouri, the state legislatures 
of Alabama, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and West Virginia can proclaim 
an emergency. See KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ALABAMA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND 
HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); MO. CRS REPORT, 
supra note 108, at CRS-3; NEV. CRS REPORT, supra note 108, at CRS-3; N.H. CRS REPORT, supra 
note 108, at CRS-3; N.C. CRS REPORT, supra note 108, at CRS-3; OKLA. CRS REPORT, supra note 
108, at CRS-3; W. VA. CRS REPORT, supra note 108, at CRS-3. But the remaining state legislatures 
do not have this power. 
 390. See authorities cited supra note 108. 
 391. In Kansas, Michigan, Utah, and Wisconsin, the governor may declare a state of emergency 
for a limited period of time, but thereafter the declaration may only be extended when approved by 
legislators. See KAN. CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at CRS-3; MICH. CRS REPORT, supra note 109, 
at CRS-3; UTAH CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at CRS-2; WIS. CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at CRS-
3. 
 392. See Interviews, supra note 21. 
 393. See, e.g., Robert A. Zarnoch, Gubernatorial Executive Orders: Legislative or Executive 
Powers, 44 MD. B.J. 48, 52 (2011) (explaining that while the Maryland legislature has the ability to 
change or supersede an executive order, “[t]his rarely occurs”). 
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executive, whose law enforcement is closer to the developing crisis. They 
may feel ill-equipped to assess the situation. 
The efficacy of lawmakers’ restraint on the President during a 
national emergency is relevant since the relationship is mirrored at the 
state level. When dealing with the executive’s power during a national 
emergency, some have proposed that the executive be permitted to 
unilaterally act only subject to approval by the legislature within a 
prescribed brief period of time.394 However, others have evaluated the 
legislature’s actions at times of crisis and concluded that the legislature is 
“unlikely to be a guardian of civil liberties.”395 State legislatures’ records 
confirm the latter conclusion, as they do not serve as restraints on the state 
or local executives during emergencies.396 This may be particularly the 
                                                     
 394. Ackerman, supra note 15, at 1047. Professor Ackerman’s proposal includes a concept that 
he terms the “supermajoritarian escalator,” which means that the percentage of legislators that would 
have to cast an approval vote for the emergency to continue increases as the duration of the emergency 
extends. Id. at 1047–50. 
 395. David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times 
of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2591 (2003). Professor Cole recounts laws passed during times of 
crisis by Congress which have been criticized as offensive to civil liberties. Id. at 2591–92; see also 
David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 
1761–68 (2004). 
 396. Even in states where the legislature has the authority to declare or terminate a state of 
emergency, the governor himself routinely acts unilaterally in proclaiming and ending the emergency. 
Numerous states’ responses to civil strife within their jurisdiction are probative of this trend of 
legislative passivity. The state of emergency instituted in Baltimore in response to the city’s 2015 
protests prompted by the police-involved death of Freddie Gray was both enacted and rescinded by 
Maryland Governor Larry Hogan. See Krishnadev Calamur, Maryland Governor Lifts State of 
Emergency in Baltimore, NPR (May 6, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/ 
2015/05/06/404675117/maryland-governor-lifts-state-of-emergency-in-baltimore [https://perma. 
cc/L66Y-ML5M]; Emily Shapiro, National Guard Troops Deployed After Violent Clashes in 
Baltimore, ABC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2015), https://abcnews.go.com/US/hundreds-people-clash-police-
baltimore-mall/story?id=30622868 [https://perma.cc/QD9E-YZT9]. The legislature played no role in 
either declaration, despite it having the statutory power to terminate the state of emergency at any 
time. CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 16. The response has been similar in the other states where 
the legislature is statutorily authorized to terminate an active state of emergency. In Wisconsin, the 
state of emergency declared in Milwaukee in response to 2016 protests spurred by a police shooting 
of an African American driver was declared unilaterally by then-Governor Scott Walker, and it expired 
naturally, without legislative involvement. Wis. Exec. Order 209 (Aug. 16, 2015); Shibani Mahtani & 
Scott Calvert, Governor Declares State of Emergency in Milwaukee After Shooting, Unrest, WALL 
STREET J. (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/violence-erupts-in-milwaukee-after-fatal-
shooting-by-police-1471157651 [https://perma.cc/MG56-RYE3]. In 2017, the state legislature had no 
involvement in the termination of a state of emergency issued by Florida’s then-Governor, Rick Scott, 
in preparation for a white supremacist’s speech at the University of Florida. As drafted, the state of 
emergency expired naturally within seven days, unless extended. Fla. Exec. Order No.17-264 (Oct. 
16, 2017). In North Carolina—a state in which the legislature has the power to both declare and 
terminate a state of emergency—the legislature has similarly remained uninvolved in instituting and 
rescinding/revoking such proclamations. In response to the 2016 Charlotte protests against the police 
killing of African American Keith Scott, the Governor declared a state of emergency without 
legislative involvement. Matthew Teague, Charlotte Protests: Governor of North Carolina Declares 
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case when it is the liberties of minority communities that are at stake—
like in Ferguson and the pipeline protests—because lawmakers are not 
representative of those communities and thus are unlikely to defend or be 
accountable to their interests.397 After Ferguson, observers highlighted the 
lack of African American representation in local government.398 The same 
was true for state governments in Missouri and North Dakota. Data from 
2015 shows that in Missouri and North Dakota about 86% of state 
legislators identified as white.399 For these reasons, community members 
and protestors cannot rely on state lawmakers to protect their 
constitutional rights during an emergency declaration. Also, as previously 
discussed, most emergency management strategies do not need a 
preceding emergency declaration to go into effect.400 Emergency 
management mechanisms offer first responders latitude to act when they 
perceive an event as a crisis.401 Thus, even before the executive declares 
an emergency, the problematic practices I have discussed will begin to 
materialize. 
B. The Judiciary has Insufficient Ability to Provide a Check on State and 
Local Emergency Management Action 
A state of emergency declaration is not immune from judicial review. 
However, review of an executive emergency declaration is highly 
                                                     
State of Emergency, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/sep/22/charlotte-protests-north-carolina-governor-declares-state-of-emergency 
[https://perma.cc/QSL3-SJZG]. In the other six states where the legislature is statutorily authorized to 
declare a State of Emergency, the legislatures have similarly taken no action. Besides Missouri and 
North Carolina, none of these six states has experienced mass protests leading to an emergency 
declaration in the last several years. However, based on the prevalence of governor-declared weather-
related states of emergency in these states, one can hypothesize that any state of emergency declared 
in relation to protests would similarly be issued by the executive. See, e.g., States of Emergency, 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF ALABAMA, https://governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/state-of-
emergency/ [https://perma.cc/2XQ7-48HL] (archiving the copious states of emergency the governor 
has instituted). 
 397. See Amber Phillips, The Striking Lack of Diversity in State Legislatures, WASH. POST (Jan. 
26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/01/26/the-real-problem-with-
diversifying-congress-state-legislatures-are-even-less-diverse/?noredirect=on&utm_term= 
.3da75a234077 [https://perma.cc/QLU6-CD9X]; Karl Kurtz, Who We Elect: The Demographics of 
State Legislatures, NCSL (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/who-
we-elect.aspx [https://perma.cc/4TAY-KX8U]. 
 398. Samuel P. Jordan, Federalism, Democracy, and the Challenge of Ferguson, 59 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 1103, 1112–13 nn.41–42 (2015). 
 399. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LEGISLATORS’ RACE AND ETHNICITY 
(2015), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/About_State_Legislatures/Raceethnicity_Rev2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q8BP-4F6X]. 
 400. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
 401. See supra Part II. 
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deferential.402 Courts inquire whether the executive’s declaration was 
made in good faith and whether there was a factual basis for it.403 The 
Supreme Court first dealt with a challenge to a state level state of 
emergency in the early 1900s in Moyer v. Peabody, when the Colorado 
Governor declared an emergency in connection to a miner’s strike.404 In 
Moyer, the plaintiff argued that the Governor and the National Guard 
violated his due process rights when he was arrested and held for over two 
weeks with no criminal charges because of his post as president of the 
Federation of Miners.405 The Court established a highly deferential review 
of a governor’s decision to declare a state of emergency by stating that 
“the governor’s declaration that a state of insurrection existed is 
conclusive of that fact.”406 When assessing the propriety of the plaintiff’s 
detention pursuant to the emergency declaration, the Court distinguished 
with approval the precautionary purpose of the plaintiff’s arrest as opposed 
to a regular arrest which requires probable cause.407 Referencing the 
Governor’s power to suppress insurrection pursuant to the Colorado 
constitution and accompanying statutes, the Court stated that “he shall 
make the ordinary use of the soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons 
who resist, and, of course, that he may use the milder measure of seizing 
the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring 
peace.”408 In Moyer, the only caveat that the Court seemingly placed on 
the power of the Governor was that he act in good faith. The language of 
the opinion further suggests lack of any judicial review and instead the 
need to “substitut[e] [] executive process for judicial process.”409 
The next time the Supreme Court considered the issue in Sterling, it 
did exert some judicial limits on the range of a governor’s actions pursuant 
to an emergency.410 Thus, a reading of Moyer that displaces any judicial 
review of a governor’s emergency power proved too broad. While the 
Court in Sterling still did not question the Texas Governor’s conclusion 
that an emergency existed, the Court reviewed the executive’s resulting 
actions.411 In that case, the Governor alleged an insurrection from a dispute 
                                                     
 402. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1909); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399–
400 (1932). 
 403. Sterling, 287 U.S. at 400; see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974). 
 404. Moyer, 212 U.S. at 82–84. 
 405. Id. at 83. 
 406. Id. at 84. 
 407. Id. at 84–85. 
 408. Id. at 84 
 409. Id. at 85; see also Jason Collins Weida, A Republic of Emergencies: Martial Law and 
American Jurisprudence, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1397, 1412–14 (2004). 
 410. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 403–04 (1932). 
 411. Id. at 395–402. 
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relating to oil production and issued “martial law” in the state.412 The 
Texas Railroad Commission had issued an order limiting oil production 
which plaintiff oil producers challenged in federal district court. In an 
attempt to override the judicial process, the Governor—pursuant to martial 
law—ordered the National Guard to shut down the oil wells.413 Looking 
past the question of what the Governor meant by martial law, the Court 
did not quarrel with the Governor’s power to call in military forces to keep 
the peace, stating, consistent with Moyer, that “his decision to that effect 
is conclusive.”414 
Despite the Supreme Court’s reference to the district court’s findings 
on the record that there was no actual uprising, no threats of violence, and 
that at most there were potential breaches of the peace, neither the 
Supreme Court nor the district court questioned the Governor’s 
proclamation of an insurrection and his general use of military power.415 
Still, the Court recognized that plaintiffs had a property right in their oil 
that could not be curtailed without due process of law and rejected the 
Texas Governor’s argument that the judiciary could not review any of his 
actions because of the proclaimed emergency.416 Instead, the Supreme 
Court clarified that “the allowable limits of military [and executive] 
discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular 
case[] are judicial questions.”417 The Court then concluded that the 
Governor had “overstepped” by curtailing the plaintiffs’ constitutional 
access to courts to vindicate their property rights and that there was “no 
military necessity” to prevent or limit lawful oil production.418 Sterling 
thus established that a governor’s emergency declaration does not mitigate 
the court’s jurisdiction over executive actions when they contravene 
constitutional rights.419 While the court will not question a governor’s 
good faith declaration of emergency, it can assess whether the specific 
executive actions, pursuant to that declaration, were “related to the 
quelling of the disorder” and necessary.420 
                                                     
 412. Id. at 387. It is also worth noting that prior to the Governor’s order, the federal district court 
had issued a temporary protective order preventing the execution of an order by the state’s Railroad 
Commission limiting oil production. Id. 
 413. Id. at 387–88. 
 414. Id. at 399. 
 415. See id. 
 416. Id. at 393. 
 417. Id. at 401. 
 418. Id. at 401, 403. 
 419. Id. at 400–02. 
 420. Id. at 400, 403–04 (“the findings of fact made by the District Court . . . leave no room for 
doubt that there was no military necessity which, from any point of view, could be taken to justify the 
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In the midst of vigorous anti-government protests, the Supreme 
Court heard the Scheuer case and concluded that it was error for the lower 
court to assume, without any actual inquiry, that the Governor was acting 
in good faith when declaring and executing a state of emergency.421 Four 
years before, the Court had refused to hear a case dealing with the 
Philadelphia mayor’s declaration of emergency after the assassination of 
Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.422 In his dissent from the dismissal of appeal, 
Justice Douglas noted that the declaration contained no factual findings 
regarding threats to peace or public safety.423 When the Court did hear 
Scheuer, it faulted the lower court for assuming, without any inquiry, that 
the Governor’s acts were in good faith.424 Scheuer involved the National 
Guard officers’ shooting and killing of Kent State University students 
protesting the Vietnam War after the Ohio Governor’s declaration of a 
state of emergency.425 The Court found that it was error for the district 
court to grant the defendant government officials’ motion to dismiss and 
lamented that, at the early stage of the proceedings, the petitioners were 
not allowed to contest the assumption of good faith given that the 
government had not introduced evidence of the executive’s intent.426 The 
Court stated that while “a declaration of emergency by the chief executive 
of a State is entitled to great weight[,] . . . it is not conclusive.”427 Notably, 
however, Scheuer provided no guidance regarding how a court should 
evaluate a governor’s actions when engaging in this inquiry. This type of 
guidance is essential. Without direction from the Supreme Court, judges 
feel generally ill-equipped to gauge executive actions at a time of 
perceived crisis, and neglect to do so out of worry that these matters are 
                                                     
action of the Governor in attempting to limit complainants’ oil production, otherwise lawful.”); see 
also Weida, supra note 409, at 1416. 
 421. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249–50 (1974). The Court also clarified in Scheuer that 
neither the governor nor other state officials acting under color of law have absolute immunity from 
suit for their unconstitutional actions during a state of emergency. Id. at 237. 
 422. Stotland v. Pennsylvania, 398 U.S. 916, 917, 920–21 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 423. Justice Douglas stated that the lower courts justified the mayor’s declaration of emergency 
“by [the] various scattered acts of disorder occurring in the City of Philadelphia . . . such as a window 
breaking, damage to automobiles, false alarms of fire, and jostling of pedestrians, some of which 
occurred incident to demonstrations.” Id. at 917. In response to the killing of Rev. Martin Luther King, 
Jr., the mayor declared a state of emergency in Philadelphia making it illegal for twelve or more people 
to gather outdoors, causing individuals to be arrested while participating in three peaceful protests. Id. 
Justice Douglas faulted the rest of the Court for the denying cert for lack of federal question, citing 
serious constitutional concern related to the emergency declaration. Id. at 920–21. 
 424. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 249–50. 
 425. Id. at 234–35. 
 426. Id. at 249–50. 
 427. Id. at 250. 
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political rather than judicial questions.428 This worry stems from the 
following factors: the fact that police powers rest in the executive, judges’ 
reticence to review gubernatorial decisions made under the pressure of an 
allegedly impending crisis, public safety concerns, and fear of massive 
disorder.429 
Since Scheuer, the Supreme Court has not considered another 
challenge to a state level emergency declaration. Lower courts dealing 
with these challenges have generally upheld state and local executive 
declarations of a state of emergency.430 Further, in the single post-Scheuer 
case where a lower court ruled that a governor’s emergency declaration 
was inappropriate, the Governor of the U.S. Virgin Islands did not allege 
a public safety threat. Instead, he attempted to bypass a government 
contracts bidding process by claiming that the need to comply with a 
federal court order to repair wastewaters systems amounted to an 
emergency.431 Courts have resisted placing any language or explicit 
emergency findings requirements on a governor’s order.432 
                                                     
 428. See United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1282 (4th Cir. 1971). While the Fourth Circuit 
decided Chalk prior to the Scheuer opinion, more recent cases have cited to Chalk as support for 
refusing to inquire into the state level emergency declaration. See Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 
(11th Cir. 1996) (discussing Chalk and the Hurricane Andrew curfew); Moorhead v. Farrelly, 727 F. 
Supp. 193 (V.I. 1989); see also Diane P. Wood, The Bedrock of Individual Rights in Times of Natural 
Disaster, 51 HOW. L.J. 747, 757–58 (2008) (discussing that courts are unlikely to “second-guess” the 
executive’s determination regarding whether a state of emergency has concluded). 
 429. Chalk, 441 F.2d at 1281–82. 
 430. See Cal. Corr. Peace Officers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008); Martin v. Mun. Court, 196 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); State ex rel. Mo. Highway and 
Transp. Comm’n v. Pruneau, 652 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Pearson, 975 So. 2d 646 
(La. Ct. App. 2007); In re Farrow, 754 A.2d 33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Cougar Bus. Owners Ass’n 
v. State, 97 P.2d 481 (Wash. 1982). 
 431. In United States v. Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004), the Governor declared a 
state of emergency, dispensing with the government contracts bidding process usually required, and 
then negotiated a contract for wastewater systems repairs to a private company. Id. at 279. There was 
evidence that the “contract was likely tainted by political corruption.” Id. The court concluded that no 
justification was provided by the Governor regarding why the requirement of repairing the wastewater 
system amounted to an emergency. Id. at 290; see also Hatton v. Mun. de Ponce, No. RE-91-37, 1994 
WL 909605 (P.R. 1994). In Hatton, the municipal finance director of the town of Ponce, Puerto Rico, 
awarded a medical equipment contracts to a private company without undergoing the required bidding 
process. Id. By the time the company attempted to deliver the medical equipment, the mayor and 
municipal finance directors were no longer in office and the new administration refused to accept the 
equipment. Id. In attempting to enforce the contract, the company alleged that there was a state of 
emergency due to the municipality’s economic crisis at the time that the contract was awarded. Id. The 
court in Hutton found that the conditions did not amount to an emergency and that no state executive 
had declared an emergency. Id.  
 432. In Farrow, the Pennsylvania court found that although the Governor did not state in his 
executive order that there was an “emergency” when he extended the deadline to file nominations for 
a primary election due to “a sudden and severe winter storm,” the Governor had satisfied the statutory 
requirements of the disaster emergency declaration by referencing inclement weather. Farrow, 754 
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Even though courts will not seriously inquire into whether the 
declaration of emergency was appropriate and routinely dismiss 
challenges to the emergency declaration, federal courts remain open 
during an emergency and will litigate claims by individuals requesting an 
injunction based on a violation of their constitutional rights when a 
government acts pursuant to an emergency. Thus, litigants often challenge 
the specific constitutional rights violation by seeking court injunctions 
against these practices, instead of confronting the emergency declaration 
as a whole.433 In addition, emergency management officials and personnel 
do not need to wait for an emergency declaration to act in a perceived crisis 
and often take action prior to such declaration.434 Their directives may be 
challenged whether or not an official state of emergency has been 
declared.435 
                                                     
A.2d at 35–36. The court ignored the petitioner’s claim that the circumstances demonstrated that there 
was no real emergency. Id. at 34–35. In Schwarzenegger, the California appellate court dismissed the 
procedural argument that Governor Schwarzenegger was required to state that he had made a finding 
that circumstances described in the relevant California statute existed to warrant the emergency. 
Instead, “[i]ssuance of the [emergency] proclamation implies the governor has made the finding. 
Therefore, it is sufficient if the proclamation sets forth circumstances that support the implied finding.” 
Schwarzenegger, 163 Cal. App. 4th at 820; see also Martin, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 697 (stating no 
findings are required under the California emergency statute). 
 433. See, e.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2005) (challenging 
the WTO no-protest zone and mass arrests but not the mayoral emergency declaration); First Amended 
Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 11, 
Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Feb. 27, 2018) (challenging police’s use of water 
cannons and less than lethal weapons on water protectors in North Dakota but not the gubernatorial 
emergency declaration); Franklin v. Missouri, No. 4:15-cv-01283, 2016 WL 366799 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 
29, 2016) (challenging police officer’s use of a “beanbag round” to shoot a Ferguson protestor in the 
eye but not the governor’s emergency declaration); Complaint at 1–14, Devereaux v. County of Saint 
Louis, No. 4:15-cv-00553-RWS (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2015) (challenging police restrictions on press 
activity and aggressive arrests of journalists in Ferguson but not the gubernatorial emergency 
declaration); Complaint at 1–3, Templeton v. Dotson, No. 4:14-cv-2019 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2014) 
(challenging police use of chemical agents on Ferguson protestors but not the gubernatorial emergency 
declaration); Complaint at 1–2, Abdullah v. County of Saint Louis, 52 F. Supp. 3d 936 (E.D. Mo. 
2014) (No. 4:14-cv-1436) (challenging the keep moving order in Ferguson but not the gubernatorial 
emergency declaration). 
 434. See supra Part II. 
 435. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, 14–27, Quraishi v. Saint Charles County, No. 4:16-cv-01320-
NAB (E.D. Mo. Aug. 15, 2016) (challenging police shooting at a journalist and police use of tear gas 
against media during the Ferguson protests prior to the gubernatorial emergency declaration); 
Complaint at 4–8, Powers v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-01299 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 9, 2016) 
(challenging unlawful and retaliatory arrests in Ferguson prior to the gubernatorial emergency 
declaration); Complaint at 1–2, 5–6, White v. Jackson, No. 4:14-cv-01490 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2014) 
(challenging aggressive and unlawful arrests in Ferguson prior to the gubernatorial emergency 
declaration); Complaint at 1–5, Hussein v. County of Saint Louis, No. 4:14-cv-1410 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 
18, 2014) (challenging police recording restrictions on media in Ferguson occurring prior to the 
gubernatorial emergency declaration). 
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As discussed in Part III, plaintiffs sought judicial relief in various 
cases alleging constitutional violations in the WTO, Ferguson, and North 
Dakota pipeline protests.436 Even where plaintiffs ultimately obtained 
beneficial rulings or injunctions, the relief did not sufficiently vindicate 
constitutional violations because it arrived too late or was ignored by 
officials. In the largest WTO litigation—the Menotti case—175 protestors 
received a settlement, but it was not until seven years after their 
unconstitutional arrest.437 Ferguson examples include the challenges to the 
“keep moving” practice where the court granted an injunction about two 
months after police engaged in the practice,438 and challenges to police use 
of tear gas against protestors which occurred for five months before the 
court issued a temporary restraining order against the practice.439 The main 
lawsuit challenging aggressive government response to pipeline protests, 
Dundon v. Kirchmeier, was filed in late 2016 and the resolution is still 
unclear, as litigation is pending.440 As the preceding litigation 
demonstrates, even where a court does intervene to stop constitutional 
rights abuses, there is a timeliness problem. The court does not respond in 
real time to piecemeal challenges of emergency practices and orders. 
There are delays associated with the filings of pleadings, obtaining a 
hearing, and a judge rendering a decision. During these delays, the 
potentially unconstitutional government activity and resulting abuses 
continue. 
Plaintiffs can also bring actions for constitutional rights violations 
against governments and state officials acting under color of law pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.441 However, expansive immunity principles allow 
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certain defendants to escape liability. Under the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, state governments cannot be sued unless they consent to it.442 
A state may waive sovereign immunity, which is determined by looking 
at that state’s law.443 Thus, litigants will often be unable to assert tort 
claims against the state itself, or those claims may be dismissed by the 
court due to sovereign immunity.444 State officials are also protected from 
Section 1983 liability by qualified immunity, which serves as expansive 
protection since it applies when the court determines that the official’s 
behavior is not in violation of a “clearly established statutory or 
constitutional right[]” that he should have known.445 For example, Fourth 
Amendment excessive force cases against police officers are quite 
complicated. Judges often rule that these claims cannot proceed to trial 
because of expansive qualified immunity principles which establish that 
police cannot be sued for using unconstitutional excessive force if an 
officer could reasonably misunderstand the constitutionary boundary.446 
Because judges must look at excessive force claims in a factually specific 
and highly “particularized” manner,447 victims of unconstitutional 
excessive force claims must point to a preceding case where a court has 
ruled factually similar police conduct unconstitutional, or the officer will 
escape litigation.448 Section 1983 lawsuits claiming that police unlawfully 
arrested protestors in violation of the Fourth Amendment are also 
challenging because in most federal circuits qualified immunity will shield 
officers that courts find had arguable probable cause to arrest, even when 
the officers were actually mistaken.449 Finally, when litigants allege that 
their First Amendment rights were violated by an unlawful arrest in 
retaliation for speech, courts will find an officer immune from suit if there 
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is arguable probable cause that justifies the arrest.450 In Menotti v. City of 
Seattle, the district court initially granted several officers qualified 
immunity on First and Fourth Amendment claims, which the Ninth Circuit 
ultimately reversed, allowing the case to proceed to trial against police 
officer defendants.451 In Dundon v. Kirchmeier, defendants in North 
Dakota have argued in their pending motions to dismiss that police officers 
“are entitled to qualified immunity as any right allegedly violated was not 
so clearly established at the time of the violation that a reasonable officer 
would have known that his actions were unlawful.”452 
C. Devising a More Protective Mechanism to Check the Executive’s 
Power in Response to Protest 
The three case narratives demonstrate that when protest is the crisis, 
the emergency declaration provokes and justifies violations of protestors’ 
First and Fourth Amendment rights. The best solution would be to for the 
courts to apply more exacting review than good faith to executive 
emergency declarations and orders invoked in response to protests. This 
would recognize the fundamental place that political protests have in 
American democratic society. To quote Justice Brandeis again, 
Those who won our . . . revolution were not cowards. . . . They did 
not exalt order at the cost of liberty. . . . Only an emergency can 
justify repression [of speech]. . . . The fact that speech is likely to 
result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to 
justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury 
to the State. Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied 
to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the 
law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly.453 
However, the assurance that speech and assembly will not be 
abridged during vigorous protest is an empty promise when an executive 
has unrestrained authority to declare an emergency, and his decision faces 
minimal judicial scrutiny. A more appropriate judicial assessment would 
subject the executive’s emergency declaration when enacted during mass 
protests to heightened review. Courts would evaluate the circumstances on 
these grounds, analyze any factual support the executive cites in his 
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declaration, inquire whether there is an impending threat to the state, and 
examine whether there are more narrowly tailored means to control the 
threat than an emergency declaration. This review would prove more 
protective of protest activity than a lax good faith standard. 
State and local government executives will have objections to this 
mechanism. They may cite separation of powers concerns; however, 
emergency declarations are not currently immune from judicial review. 
Thus, the precedent supports courts evaluating the executive’s actions. It 
is a fair assertion that the courts’ review of these orders has been highly 
deferential because of judges’ concerns about the need for immediate 
action and the perceived unfairness of evaluating the governors’ actions in 
hindsight.454 I am not suggesting that state and local executives obtain 
judicial approval before making an emergency declaration. The Sixth 
Circuit has already rejected the proposition of a judicial prior restraint of 
a governor’s ability to declare an emergency.455 Furthermore, the 
exigencies may demand a quicker response than a court can provide.456 
Still, individuals should be able find pertinent recourse within the courts 
for overbroad emergency declarations that suppress their ability to protest. 
This heightened judicial review would help protect the rights of 
demonstrators when the protest is the purported emergency. However, it 
is not enough. As my discussion of the events in Ferguson demonstrates, 
executives and first responders sometimes react immediately in aggressive 
crisis mode when the prospect of an emergency declaration looms.457 Law 
enforcement feed the information loop and can shape top executive and 
emergency management officers’ understanding of the nature of protests 
and protestors, thus making an emergency declaration a certainty.458 The 
governor (or mayor) must tune in and obtain guidance from individuals 
whose focus is the protection of protest activity. I propose a council that 
will advise the executive on how to more fairly respond to protests in a 
manner that is protective of the individual liberties of protestors. Chief 
executives and emergency officials will wield their authority more 
judiciously with the counsel of relevant experts. Thus, the emergency 
advisory council should convene whenever a jurisdiction’s executives and 
emergency management personnel respond to mass protests. 
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The main duty of this council would be to advise the chief executive 
and engage with emergency management personnel on the handling of a 
perceived crisis associated with public protests, with a particular emphasis 
of protecting First and Fourth Amendment rights. This duty should dictate 
the protest council membership in terms of numbers and expertise. 
Because the council must be able to respond quickly and fairly to a 
perceived exigency, membership should cap at a small number, in addition 
to the top emergency management official. Any greater number would be 
unwieldy and hamper decision making. Regarding the council’s expertise, 
members should be knowledgeable in areas of constitutional law, conflict 
management, policing, and cultural competence. Council members may 
include the following: 
 Civil Rights Attorney459 
 Police Representative (with special training in de-escalation, 
implicit bias, and cultural competence)460 
 Social Media Expert461 
Missing from this list is an expert in negotiation and conflict 
resolution. This is a neutral individual not embroiled in the issue either 
from the government’s or protestors’ perspectives but with the skills to 
help these groups reach a peaceful resolution. My early research suggests 
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that a conflict resolution specialist,462 a community mediator,463 or a crisis 
negotiator464 could possess these skills. Also missing is a protest leader. 
This omission is due to the fact that council membership must be 
determined before any crisis so that the council can convene and act 
quickly. However, among the responsibilities of some of the experts—
particularly the civil rights attorney and negotiator—council members 
should be seeking out engagement from these individuals either by having 
them sit on the council or communicating their perspectives. 
To provide for the best possible action, the council should establish 
appropriate protocols and structures to respond before any crisis 
associated with public protest. The council might agree on what factors 
must be present before taking emergency action, how to tailor the action 
to protect constitutional liberties, degree of threats, necessary training, 
drills, etc. 
An open question is how this council would come into effect. At the 
state level, a governor might recognize the benefits of receiving this expert 
advice and choose to voluntarily institute the council. A politically savvy 
executive could foresee as a benefit the fact that the council may provide 
political cover when engaging in a controversial emergency action. 
Although this is a risk, the benefit of exerting influence on the form and 
manner of emergency action might be worth it. 
Nevertheless, a problem with a council that is voluntarily instituted 
by the executive may be that the council may not be able to bind the 
governor or mayor. Also, a successor unwilling to share executive 
emergency power might dismantle the council. Thus, to create a 
permanent body to effectively check on the chief executive’s power, state 
legislatures should enact the council. Some may assert that separation of 
powers questions are associated with such legislative action. Nevertheless, 
in states where the executive already shares emergency authority with the 
legislature—because lawmakers can initiate, terminate, or need to approve 
continuation of the emergency—the existing structure of emergency 
power may suggest that there are no separation of powers concerns. In 
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addition, legislatively created councils already exist in multiple state 
jurisdictions.465 These councils provide policy advice to the governor 
related to certain natural disasters or hazardous waste.466 While the council 
I suggest is admittedly different because it would be engaged in guiding 
decision making during the perceived crisis—the protest—both the 
existence of statutorily enacted councils and the fact that lawmakers do 
possess emergency authority suggest that the conception of a protest 
council has a precedent. In any event, the granular separation of powers 
question is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether it is asylum seekers at the southern border or protestors on 
the city streets, the concept of emergency is malleable. At the state level, 
constitutions and statutes set no real parameters on what amounts to an 
emergency. This is dangerous for constitutional liberties when the 
emergency is mass public dissent. Moreover, emergency management 
mechanisms do not require a threshold legal emergency before authorities 
respond to a perceived crisis. Law enforcement can call in excess police 
from surrounding jurisdictions via mutual aid agreements, utilize military 
grade equipment and tactics against activists, and employ existing laws to 
effectuate arrest. Once the executive declares an emergency, it aggravates 
the use of oppressive police tactics and also expands executive power. 
State and local officials can institute a curfew, close public streets to 
dissent, arrest for failure to adhere to emergency orders, deviate from 
regular procedures and institute ad hoc rules, and call in the National 
Guard. When the protest is the emergency, the protest narratives 
demonstrate that the result is pervasive suppression of protest activity in 
violation of our constitutional rights and founding principles. A solution 
that serves to protect speech and assembly rights must occur on both 
judicial and executive fronts. First, government executives’ responses to 
mass protests should be guided by an expert emergency council whose 
goals include protection of constitutional liberties and de-escalation. 
Second, courts should scrupulously scrutinize any emergency declared in 
response to protests. This prescription will better preserve the freedom to 
vigorously dissent while in search of our American ideals. 
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